WILEY v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
WILEY v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BRATTLEBORO.
National Banks, created under the Act of Congress, have no power to bind
themselves or the corporators, by accepting bonds, coin, or other valuable things,
upon special deposit, for safe keeping and return on demand, and no recovery can be
had against the bank for any such deposit left with the cashier and not returned

on request.
THIS was an action on the case in three counts, with a count in
trover, for certain United States bonds.
The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that in January 1869,
at the defendant's banking-house in Brattleboro, he delivered to
S. M. Waite, who then was, and ever since has been, the cashier
of said bank, $2400 worth of United States 5-20 bonds, and the
plaintiff offered in evidence, and it was admitted under defendant's
oljection, a written receipt in the words and figures following, to
wit
"THE

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BRATTLEBORO.

Brattleboro,Vt., Jan. 8, 1869.
Lucius L.Wiley has deposited in this bank twenty-four July1 . 1s6.

hundred dollars of 5- 2 0s, 1867, for safe keeping, as a
special deposit.

han.5, 1670.

July, 0.
.. 17..

S. M. WAITE, C."

The words " The First National Bank of Brattleboro," were a
printed heading to the paper on which said receipt was written.
The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that at the several dates
minuted on the margin of said paper, he called at said bank, and
said Waite paid him the interest on said bonds, and entered said
memoranda on the margin of the paper, that in August 1871, he
presented said receipt to said Waite at said bank, and demanded
said bonds of him ; that said Waite replied that he wished he had
them, but they were gone, and did not then nor has he since delivered said bonds to the plaintiff; that some time before said
demand was made, said Waite informed him that said bonds had
been stolen the June before.
The plaintiff conceded that the defendant was a National Bank,
duly organized under the Act of Congress of June 1864, known as
the "National Currency Act," and upon the above evidence rested
his case.
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The defendant gave no evidence tending to show that said bonds
had in fact been stolen, nor did the evidence show, save as above
stated, any reason for not delivering said bonds when demanded as
aforesaid.
The defendant offered no evidence, and declined to go to the
jury with any question of fact, but asked the court to hold as a
matter of law, that under said Act of Congress, national banks
could not be held liable for special deposit; that said Waite could
only bind himself, and not the bank, by the contract set forth in
said receipt. No other question was raised by defendant.
The court, pro forma, declined to hold as requested, but directed
a verdict for the plaintiff, to which the defendant excepted, and the
case was certified to the Supreme Court.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-Although the plaintiff has in this action declared
as for a. tort, still, so far as the tort rests upon contract, the same
rules are to govern that would if the contract itself had been
declared upon ; as was said concerning actions of tort founded on
the contracts of infants in Towne et al. v. Wiley, 23 Vt. 355, and
was held respecting the tort of a married woman resting on her
contract, in Woodward & Perkins v. Barnes and Wi'fe, 46 Vt.
332. The assumption of the obligation that the law imposes upon
a depositary to keep the deposit, is, of itself, a contract, as is apparent from the nature of the transaction, and from authority :
Jones on Bail. 5; Story on Bail. § 50. In this case there is no
evidence of any actual conversion of the plaintiff's bonds to the
use of the defendant bank. And in the evidence of some constructive conversion, which the demand and refusal might otherwise
afford, what was said in connection with making the refusal is to be
taken as a part of it, and altogether that does not show any refusal
in denial of the plaintiff's right, but rather a want of power to
deliver, and an excuse for it, which would be very doubtful if not
insufficient evidence of a conversion, if the demand had been made
of the party who had become the depositary: 2 Greenl. Ev., § 644 ;
and would be none whatever of a conversion by the bank, in this
case, unless it bad itself become the depositary. The transactions
by which the plaintiff claims that the hank had become the depositary were wholly with the cashier, and their effect to charge the
bank rests entirely upon his power in that direction. There is no
WHEELER,
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controversy, and could not properly be any, that if the taking
of these bonds to keep, as they were taken by the cashier, was
within the scope of the corporate business of the bank, then the
bank did become the depositary of them subject to the liabilities of
that relation ; and if without, not.
A bank is an institution for the custody, loaning, exchange or
ssue of money, and for facilitating the transmission of funds by'
draft or bills of exchange: Webster's Diet. ; Burrill's Law Dict.;
Bouvier's Law Diet., tit. Bank. In Foster v. Essex Bank, 17
Mass. 497, the bank was chartered by that name with power to
contract by it and without other express powers, leaving the scope
of its corporate business almost wholly to implication: but, according to the special verdict in the case, it had always been its practice
to receive special deposits of money and other valuable things with
the knowledge of and without objection by its directors. An important question in the case,. which was debated by as able counsel
as any in the country, was as to the power of the president and
cashier to bind the bank by taking a large amount of gold coin in
kegs to keep, on the taking of which a memorandum of its weight
and amount was made, to which the president appended a statement signed by him (but not by his official title), that the coin was
weighed in his presence, and the cashier a statement, signed by him
as cashier, that it was left at the bank for safe keeping. After
much deliberation, it was decided that, on account of that practice,
and not because it was a part of legitimate banking business, the
bank became charged with the liabilities of a depositary of the
coin.' That case is much relied upon for the plaintiff in this case,
and no other case as to the scope of the powers of banks, of sufficient importance to attract the attention of counsel, appears to
have arisen and been decided between that and the passage of the
Act of Congress, in 1864, under which this bank was organized.
In authorizing the formation of banks under that act, the framers
of it must have had in view what the objects of banks were defined
to be and what their powers were understood to be; and, with
those things in view, after providing how the banks might be organized and officered, make contracts, sue and defend, enacted that
they might exercise under that act "all such incidental powers as
shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and
other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits ; by buying and sell-
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ing exchange, coin and bullion; by loaning money on personal
security; by obtaining, issuing and circulating notes according to
the provisions of this act." Deposits in banks had then long been
well understood to mean the placing of money in a bank, to the
credit of the depositor, to be used by the bank as its own, and be
drawn against by, or paid to, the depositor at his pleasure, and not
the delivery of either money, securities, or other property, to be
specifically kept and re-delivered. These latter had been equally
well known as special deposits: Story on Bail. § 88; Posterv. -Essex
Bank, 17 Mass. 497. The receiving of such special deposits is
not in any sense necessary to carrying on the business of banking.
If made of money even, no use could be made of it whatever, nor
could any profit be derived from it unless charge should be made
for the custody, and then that business would be more like that of
a warehouseman than that of a banker. The receiving such general deposits is a part of ordinary banking business, and power to
receive them is necessary to carrying on that part and useful to
carrying on others ; and when Congress granted to the banks the
incidental powers necessary to carry on the business of banking
by receiving deposits, the kind of deposits that the settled meaning
of the term, used in such connection, would apply to, and the kind
that would answer the description as to being necessary, must have
been intended. The express grant of powers mentioned is, on
familiar principles, an implied exclusion of all not mentioned. It
has been urged with plausibility, for the plaintiff, that the mention
of special deposits in section 46 of the act shows that such were
meant to be included among those that the banks, by section 8, are
u,thorized to receive. But the provisions of section 46 are made
solely with reference to winding up the affairs of banks after their
business has been stopped, and not at all with reference to the
prosecution of it ; and this'part of the section has especial reference
to restricting, and not any to enlarging, their powers. And then
banks that would have deposits as security for loans might have
their business stopped, and, if so, under the provision that they
should not prosecute business except to receive and keep their
money, they might be embarrassed about such special deposits, on
payment of the debts without such a provision as that in section
46 authorizing the delivery of them. But, whatever else may have
been the purpose of inserting that clause there, it seems plain that
it was not intended to add to powers that had been so categorically
VOL. XXIII--44
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set forth in another separate section as to indicate that all were
intended to be named there.
This Act of Congress, besides authorizing the formation of banks,
provided a mode for organizing them by the shareholders signing a
certificate stating the name, place, and amount of stock of the bank,
the number of shares to each stockholder, and a declaration that
the certificate was made to-enable them to avail themselves of the
advantages of that act. In the absence of any showing, it is presumed, from the concession that this is a national bank organized
under that act, that it was organized in that mode ; and, in organizing in that way, the shareholders would have a right to and would
understand that they were engaging in no business except that
which the act authorized, and that their officers, chosen by them
under that act, would have no authority to enter into any business other than that ; to bind them, and to allow the officers to
jeopardize their interests, by engaging in other business to the advantage of other persons, would allow the officers to perpetrate a
fraud on the shareholders for the benefit of others.
It is insisted for the plaintiff that the cashier by taking the
bonds and delivering the written certificate that they were deposited in the bank for safe keeping, bound the bank to keep them
safely, and that it has thereby become responsible for them. But,
although Lord CoKE in his report of Southeote's Case, 4 Rep. 83, and
in his commentary on Littleton, 1 Inst. 89 a. b., considered that a
bailment to keep merely and one to keep safely were of the same
obligation, other reports of that case do not seem to warrant his
conclusion from it: Southeote v. Bennett, Cro. Eliz. 815. And
it appears to be now well settled that there is a substantial difference between the two undertakings: Uoggs v. Bernard,2 Ld. Raym.
911; Jones onBail. 48; Story on Bail. § 72. In Foster v. Essex
Bank, it was expressly decided that neither the cashier nor the
president of that bank, even when it had followed the practice of
taking special deposits, could bind it by an express promise to keep
the coin deposited safely, because such a promise would be
outside the practice of taking to keep merely. And clearly,
on the authority of that case, the cashier in this case could
not bind this bank by an express promise to keep the plaintiff's bonds safely. And the undertaking to keep, implied
from the mere acceptance of a deposit, is as far outside the
authorized business of this bank as that express undertaking was
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outside the practice of that one. This case does notsliow that.the
cashier placed these bonds in the vault, or with the property of
the bank, at all; but doubtless the plaintiff expected he would, and
lie did put them into the vault of the bank. But, if lie did, he did
not do it as the agent of the shareholders of the bank in their
corporate capacity, for-lie had not been made agent for such a purpose. If lie had himself become a depositary and put them there
because lie considered that to be a safe place for him to keep them
in, then the bank is no more liable for them than it would be for
bonds of his own if lie should put them there for the same reason.
If lie was the plaintiff's agent in putting them there, they were
there at the plaintiff's risk as much as they would have been if the
plaintiff had himself, with leave of the person in charge, placed
them there. In neither case would the bank be any more liable
than a merchant would be if the plaintiff should .get his clerk to
lock bonds of the plaintiff in his safe ; or than a town would be if
lie should get the town clerk to lock his bonds into the safe used
to keep the town records in. The cashier had no authority to bind
the bank by any contract for the custody of the bonds, and the
mere fact, if it was the fact, that they got into the vault of the
bank would not charge the bank with their custody. National
banks have uses for government bonds, and might in various ways,
probably, convert them to their use, and should they do so they
would unquestionably be liable for the tort as natural or other artificial persons would; but as this case now stands no such cause of
action appears.
roster v. Essex Bank is the only one of the cases cited in argument, or that has been observed, that has involved any question
enough like the leading one in this case to afford any direct guide
for its decision ; and there is this difference between that case and
this, that in that case the charter did not proceed to express what
powers the bank should have to malie contracts and to do business,while in this the act under which this bank is organized does expressly set forth what powers the banks should have, and does not
include power to take special deposits am6ng them. This case
would have been like that as to powers of the banks if the Act of
Congress after authorizing the formation of banks with powers to
contract, sue, and be sued, had stopped there, without setting forth
anything about the business as to which theymight contract. As
it is, the case has had to be decided more upon the construction
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of t.he Act of Congress, considered with reference to settled principles that stand about the subject, than upon decided cases. And
upon that act so considered it is determined here that the taking
such special deposits to keep, merely for the accommodation of the
depositor, is not within the authorized business of such banks, and
that their cashiers have no power to bind them to any liability on
any express contract accompanying or any implied contract arising
out of such taking.
And this conclusion cannot work any injustice or hardship to
the plaintiff, for be dealt with the cashier because he chose to, riot
because he was obliged to, and if the cashier in the dealings assumed to have any power he did not have, the plaintiff trusted him
in that respect and has his responsibility to rely upon to vindicate
the assumption. And if the cashier incurred any liability as for
himself, the plaintiff likewise trusted him about that and has the
same responsibility of the cashier to look to for it.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
We have here a new view upon the
question of the responsibility of banks
for special deposits. It is here distinctly held, that all such undertakings
are entirely ultra vires of the corporation, and wholly beyond its capacity or
power of undertaking in any form or
This form
under any circumstances.
of presenting the question is certainly
not a little sartling to our quiet sense
of securityin what has been clearly and
unquestionably recognised as undoubted
law in this country ever since the decision in Foster v. The Essex Bank, 17
Iass. 479, in 1821,now more than half
the time of our national existence.
That case has been regarded as entitled
to special confidence and respect, both on.
account of the exceptional ability of the
argument of counsel and the opinion of
the court. It is, perhaps, one of the
ablest of the Massachusetts decisions, at
a time when that state made most of
the law for New England, and had more
weight throughout the country than
almost any other court. The question
there, too, being distinctly made by the
most eminent counsel and argue.l with

complete exhaustiveness, as this was,
thus lenying nothing pertinent unsaid,
and nothing to give it force and conclusiveness to be desired; and then solemnly
deciaed by an elaborate opinion from
one of the ablest and most learned of the
American judges, very naturally gave
it, in the minds of the profession throughout the country, almost the binding efficacy of a national statute, if there had
been any legislative authority to enact
one.

It is this sense of the finality of the
decision, in this important case, involving, as it did, nearly fifty thousand
dollars in coin, that has led, we think,
to its having.ever since passed without
so much as a doubt being expressed, so
far as we have been able to find, in any
of the numerous cases, where the question was fundamental to the plaintiffs'
claim, many of which are found in the
American reports. There are two cases
in Pennsylvania where this question
might have been raised, and if sustained,
would have been fatal to the plaintiffs'
claim, in neither of which it seems to
have been passed upon by the court, if
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indeed it was presented for consideration : Lancaster Nat. Bank v. Sinith, 62
'eun. St. 47 ; Scott v. Nat. Bank of Chester l'alle, 72 Id. 471. In the former of
these cases the deposit was delivered by
the officers of the bank to one having no
authority to receive it, and it was held
to be a question for the jury how far
the bank officers were guilty of culpable'negligence. In the latter ease the
deposit was abstracted by the teller of
the bank; and the court held it not
such negligence as would make the bank
responsible for the act of the teller, that
it had allowed him to retain his place
in the bank after its officers were aware
that the teller had made one successful
speculation in stocks. The same question existed in Jharine Bank of Chicago
v. Chandler, 27 111.525 ; Smith v. First
National Bank of f'eitfield, 99 Mass.
605. Other cases might be referred to,
but all, so far as we know, rest solely
upon the authority of Foster v. Essex
Bank, sapra. And while it seems to us
somewhat doubtful how far this unbroken
current of decision for more than half a
century, will be likely to be affected by
anything we could urge against its
soundness, we are so entirely convinced
that it rests upon no satisfactory basis
of principle, that we shall venture a
few suggestions in addition to the very
able, and to us satisfactory, opinion of
the learned judge in the principal case.
It will be noticed that the decision in
Foster v. Essex Bank, as to tile responsibility of the bank for special deposits,
was not indispensable to the decision of
the case. The other question was conelusive for the bank.
But not relying too much upon this,
it is evident, upon tile first impression,
that no bank of discount and deposit
can fairly be said to have any charter
for keeping valuables in its vaults for
the convenience of others. It might be
thought by some that there is a possible
distinction between the national banks
and the former banks chartered under

the states, inasmuch as it is unquestionably competent for the states to create
corporations fbr receiving special deposits of coins or bonds, or other valuables, for custody merely, either with
or without compensation, while it seems
certain that Congress possesses no such
function under the Constitution. But
the two cases just cited from Pennsylvania, and the one from the 99th of Mass.
Reports, are all cases of national banks,
and no such distinction is suggested, and
it seems to usofno great accouit,whether
the authority creating the corporation is
defective in power or voluntarily withholds it. The power of Congress in
creating banks of discount and deposit
is restricted by tile Constitution under
which the power is derived, to the furnishing of a circulating medium and
the convenient use of the same in the
transactions of trade and commerce.
Congress could not, therefore, by express grant, create a corporation for
the mere custody of coin, bonds and
other valuables for the convenience
or security of the owners, which the
states unquestionably might do. But
it seems equally clear that the state
banks were not intended for any such
purpose. It seems to be supposed in
the opinion in the principal case that, in
the case of the Essex Bank, there was
no express provision allowing it to keep
deposits of any kind, but that this was
left to general implication from the nature of the institution, which would have
much the same force as an express provision. We notice, however, in the
argument of counsel for the bank, that
its charter did contain an express provision for receiving deposits for safekeeping, and it was allowed to discount,
to a certain extent, upon its deposits,
and in its annual or stated reports to
the state authorities, these deposits were
required to be specifically set forth,*hich
could only apply to general deposits,
since the bank could exercise no such
functions in regard to special deposits,
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from all which it is apparent the same
argument arises as in the case of the
national bank charters, that an express
authority being given to receive one
class of deposits, all others, e.r ri termini,
are excluded upon the ba-is of the
maxim, eTpressio utius est e.clusio altotins. It is not claimed in the opinion
of the court, in the Essex Bank case,
that the charter of the bank embraced
any authority, even by implication, to
receive these special deposits.
It is
placed expressly upon the ground that
the bank, by its constant usage and
practice in accepting such deposits by
its officers, had virtually enlarged its
charter, or its business at all events, so
as to embrace this. This all seems to
us an entire misconception of the law
of corporations, and really adopting the
law applicable to natural persons in its
stead. Much of the argument of the
court in the Essex Bank case goes upon
this ground, as if there were no difFerence between the case of a natural person and a corporation in regard to extending its business. The fact is that,
so far from the cases being similar or
analogous in this respect, they are in
direct contrast. A natural person possesses an unlimited power of extension
and change in regard to action or
business, while a corporation is restricted to the very business defined in its
charter, and possesses no power to undertake any other without the express
consent of the state and of the corporators. It is this restricted power of corporations which enables them to secure
capital by affording the investors a sure
guaranty against being exposed to any
other hazards than such as are defined
in the charter. The subscriptions to the
capital stock are not only made upon
this express guaranty, but the directors
are chosen, and all the officers of the
corporation are appointed, under the
same express limitation, and all their
powers are defined under these express
limitations.

It is upon this ground that it has been
so often held that ainy fudamental
alteration of the charter of' a corporation, by which new rc-pon.-ibiitics are
assumed, will relieve the sub-cribsrs to
the stock from payment ; and if the
shares have been bellore paid up. will
enable tle hollers to re'train tie corporation, by injunction in equity, front
applying any of the moneys of" the
original corporation to the enlarged
businees, as where a railway company
have obtained a modification of their
charter to enable them to build or buy
steamiboats for the extension of the line
of travel, and thu- rendering it nre
complete and consequently more productive : Inri/;,'d J- X. . ly. v. C'oswell, 5 Ilill 383 ; St'. ivas v. !nal,ol
,3"
3urlington 1l!1., 29 Vt. 545, where the
question is very exhaustively and learnedly discussed by BExETT, Chancellor. We have collected the authorities
upon this point in I Railways 206, et
seq., which we cannot otherwise here
enumerate than by this reference. The
same views are inaintained in Xiqlent
v. The Supervisors, 19 Wallace 241.
This doctrine is established beyond all
question by the uniform current of
authority.
How, then, it may be asked, if the
business of a corporation cannot be fundnmentally change(], even 1iy act of the
legislature, so long as one shareholder
dissents, without the purchase of his
shares upon his own terms,comes it about
that the mere subordinate officers of
such corporations, the cashiers of banks,
or the station-masters of railways (for
the case would be the same if these
special deposits were placed in the safe
of a railway company for safe-keeping),
should possess the power of committing
the responsibility of their corporations
to an entirely new and extra-hazardous
extension of their legitimate business as
defined in their charters? There is nothing in the mere practice of the officers
of a corporation which has any tendency
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to define or fix the responsibility of the
corporation, except it have reference to
the proper and legitimate functions of
such corporations. Within the proper
range of the defined business for which
a corporation is created, no doubt, the
u-age or practiec of the moneyed
agents and servants of such corporations
is of controlling force in defining the
jiowers of such agents or servants in
binding the corporations. But beyond
that safe, and clearly-defined, and wellknown limit, the usage and practice of
such agents or servants can have no

force whatever in binding the corporation, for the best of all reasons, that it
is a matter entirely outside of their
proper functions and legitimate authority, as defined in tihe charter of the
corporation, to which all persons are
bound to refer in judging of the authority of such agents and servants to bind
such corporations.
It should therefore be shown that
this matter of receiving special deposits
comes fairly within the range of the
business of the corporation, in order to
give the practice of the officers of the
bank in accepting them any force in fixing the responsibility of the corporation.
But this, we believe, it will be impossible to maintain with any plausibility.
These special deposits are not only outside the proper business of a bank,
either of discount or deposit, or both,
but there is no fair way in which it can
be made accessory to the banking business in any form or degree. Special
deposits are mere merchandise, whether
they consist of American or foreign coin,
national, state or municipal bonds, or
silver or gold plate, or any other valuable commodity in small space, such as
lace or cashmere shawls. The bank
acquires no property in such deposits and
no lien upon them, except by special
contract, for any indebtedness of the
depositor. It cannot, therefore, increase its discounts on their account.
They are made in this form often when

consisting of coin, because the depositor
is unwilling to trust to the responsibility
of the bank alone. He prefers to remain the owner of the coin. There is
no reason why these deposits should be
made, or should ever have been made,
in banks, because of their general business under their charters, but solely on
account of their possessing extra means
of keeping such deposits safely; and
there is no more reason for calling suchpackages "deposits," than for calling
similar packages "deposits," when left
with any other warehouseman for safe
custody. In former times time banks
were the only places where such valuables could be made safe from deprelation. Hence the officers of the bank,
and some of the shareholders prohably
and naturally,would avail themselves of
the protection of the bank vaults. But
it seems to ns an entire mistake and misapprehension to treat this as an extension of the business of the bank. It is
no business of the bank any way, and
so every one must consider it who views
it justly. The bank derives no profit
from it and acquires no interest in the
deposits: Ex parte Brown, 3 Deacon 91;
Ex parle Bond, I M. D. & G. 10; and
being clearly outside of its proper functions, every one is bound to treat it as
a mere indulgence granted by the officers
of the bank to its friends, to be accepted
by those who use it, wholly at their own
risk. There is no reason why such deposits might not now be just as well
made in tile
safe of a railway or manufacturing corporation, and would any
one claim that this imposed any responsibility upon such corporations ? Surely
not.
In Foster. v. The Essex Bank, the
court seem to suppose the cashier may
bind the bank in accepting the parcel,
but not in giving assurance of its safekeeping. This seems to as an entire
denial of the very ground upon which
the court fix any responsibility upon the
bank. For, if by the usage of the bank
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the business had become extended so as
to embrace the keeping of these special
deposits, and the cashier was the proper
officer to accept such deposits, and
thereby bind the bank, he must of necessit- have the power to bind the bank by
his acts and declarations within tile
range of this portion of his employment. If lie coull bind the bank by
accepting the deposit, lie could equally
bind it by the terms of the acceptance,
since it comes equally within the range
of his employment. To argue tie contrary, seems to us in conflict with tire
entire law of agency upon this point.
The agent may always bind the principil within the range of his employment.
If this had become the proper business
of the bank by usage and practice, then
tire agent employed by the bank to receive those deposits must, from tile very
necessity of the case, have authority to
fix the terms of the acceptance, whether
to keep merely at the risk of the owner,
or to keep safely, with or without compensation. We might almost as well
argue that the cashier may receive
general deposits, hut has no power to
fix the terms of their acceptance. If
both come within the enlarged functions
of the bank, then the authority of the
cashier will be'the same in both.
We are fully aware that the practice
of corporations has often been allowed
to extend their responsibility, somewhat
beyond the precise terms of definition
used in their charters. It often becomes
almost indispensable to give the range
of the business of corporations this extension in order to escape absurdities.
It is upon this ground that tle courts
have felt compelled to hold railways responsible upon contracts for transportation off their immediate lines. But this
rule of the extension of the business of
a corporation by tile acquiescence of the
corporators in the officers' doing business in a somewhat wider range than
the terms of tle charter seemed to have
contemplated, must always be very

clearly shown, and must never be
allowed to extend to aniy rrsiness of an
entirely different character : Allylreny
Cly v. .1[cClarkan, 14 'enn. St. 81 ;
Htouldsrcorth v. Evans, L. It. 3 Iln. Lds.
263,by Lord CtRANWORTH ; Jritihh Provident Ins. Co. ; Ax parte Grady, 9 Jar.
N. S. 631. It is heresaid, whrt all good
lawyers know, that where there is a dlefeet of capacity ill tile company to do tire
act, tile power cannot he created l*v the
express agreement of the slreblolders,
nor can it be presumed from any extent
of acquiescence. Bitt wil-re only certain formalities are required to the valid
execution of the act, as the cont-et of a
general meeting of tile shureholders,
that will be presumed from acquiescence.
This is unquestionably the
settled rule of law upo tire snbiject at
the present time.
How, then, can it be argued, with
any plausibility, that these banks of discount and deposit have no defect of
authority to become warehousemen for
tile safe custody of valuable parcels?
For it is impossible to argue, with lahusibility even, as we have hefore intimated, that this function is any more
nearly connected with the appropriate
duties of banks than of railways. It is
a business entirely distinct from that of
either, except that railways keep warehouses for the safe deposit of goods
awaiting transportation or delivery.
And banks keep vaults for the safe custody of their own coin or bills, or other
valuable papers, and also for the safe
keeping of their collateral securities,
which is the only form in wich a bank
of discount and deposit can become responsible for the safe keeping of any
special deposit-that is, when tlre deposit is accepted as security. In every
other case the deposit is with the officer
accepting it, and not with the bank, and
his placing it among the securities of
the bank is wholly unauthorized so far as
the corporation is concerned. It is, too,
superadding to the legitimate functions
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of the bank, not only a distinct business and one having no proper connection with that of the bank, but one
also of a very dangerous character.
This business of keeping special deposits has become so extensive and so
dangerous to the banks that it has become a distinct occupation in the cities
in which large capital is invested, and
extensive precautions are taken, altogether inconsistent with the ordinary
business of banking, which only shows
more clearly the mistake in allowing to
attach it to the hanks. It seems to us,
therefore, that if the courts have been
pressed, by the exigencies of one class
of business, at an early day, to adopt a
rule of law inconsistent with the acknowledged principles, applied to analogous questions, it is time to recede from
the position when the demands of that
class of business have brought about such
changes as no longer to require the protection of the exceptional rule of law.
For if anything is clear upon principle,
it seems to us this is, if we have made
ourselves understood. And we must be
allowed to express our gratification that
the court, in the principal case, bare
had the self-reliance to place this question upon what we believe every lawyer
will recognise as its true basis, and to disregard a course of decisions obviously
in violation of principle, and resting
solely upon the Essex Bank case, which
seems originally to have been decided
upon the maxim, Communis errorfacit
jus, if any case ever was ; and that is
not a maxim which has ever received
much countenance from the courts so
far as its literal import is concerned :
ELLE~nOROUGO, Ch. J., in Isherwood
v. Ohk/now, 3 M. & S. 396, 397, and
cases cited in Broom's Leg. Maxims 104.
The Court of Appeals of New York, in
First National Bank of Lyons v. Ocean
National Ban, reported in the Legal
Gazette, 23d April 1875, decide' a
question very similar to that in the principal case, but place their decision, finalVOL. XXIII.-45

ly, upon the ground, that if the power
of the bank to accept special deposits be
conceded, it is clear that the cashier and
other general executive officers of the
bank have no authority to bind the
bank by their acceptance, and upon this
point sent the case down for a new
trial, reserving the broad question of
the capacity of the bank to make any
such contract, for consideration when it
become necessary to decide it. But the
court review the cases and discuss the
principles bearing on the latter question
in a very thorough manner, and with an
obvious tendency to the same conclusion
we have attempted to vindicate, so that
we can entertain no reasonable doubt
that the court will, finally, reach that
conclusion.
Indeed we cal scarcely
comprehend how the court could reach
the conclusion they did, except upon the
ground, that accepting special deposits
is not the natural and legitimate business of the national banks, or of any
other mere banks of discount and deposit. The court here cite from the
opinion of COULTER, J., in Lloyd T.
West Branch Bank, 15 Penn. St. 172,
with apparent approbation, language
which seems to us to cover the whole
controversy:, "It was never designed
by the provisions of the statute that the
bank should be converted into a kind
of pawnbroker shop." The language
of Lord SELOntNE, Chancellor, in
Great Eastern Railway v. Turner, Law
Rep. 8 Ch. App. 152, may be regarded
as a very brief and comprehensive statement of the law applicable to this
question. "The company is a mere
abstraction of law. All that it does, all
that the law imputes to it, as its act,
must be that which can be legally done,
within the powers vested in it by law.
Consequently an act which is ultra vires,
and unauthorized, is not an act of the
company, in such a sense, as that the
consent of the company to that act can
be pleaded."
We have not deemed it expedient to
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go much into other questions of law,
which will arise in this Asss of cases,
where the responsibility of the bank, as
bailee, is rceognised.
They are in the
main, not attended with much difficulty,
and have been very much discussed in
many recent cases. If the bailment is
gratuitous, and no special undertaking
on the part of the bailee for safe keeping, he can only be held responsible in
cases of very obvious negligence such
as no careful man would be guilty of in
his own affairs of like character. The
question of presumption, or burden of
proof, upon this, and many other
questions connected with the law of
bailments, is left by the decisions, in too
much uncertainty and conflict to be encountered at the close of a long note.
And it is never, or but seldom, a question of much practical importance.

Good lawyers will not generally feel
compelled to allow their- cases to turn
upon tile mere refinements of the burden of proof and prindfacie presumptions, when they possess substantial
merits beyond all this. AnybIailee who
does not Warrant the success of his tntertaking, like carriers and innkeeper,
perhaps, may exonerate himself for not
restoring the thing bailed, by showing
that it was taken from him by robbery

or theft without his fault, and that is
to be so regarded when his own goods
suffer in the same way at the saute time.
And even where the bailce call give no
account of the loss, or how it happened,
he is still exonerated if lie took such
care as the nature of the bailment required, and the goods have been ab.
stracted without his fault.
I. F. R.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
BROWN AND OTTO v. WERNER.
A division wall may become a party-wall by agreement, either actual or presumed ; and although such wall may have been built exclusively upon the land of
one, if it has been used and enjoyed in common by the owners of both houses for a
period of twenty years, the law will presume, in the absence of evidence showing
that such use and enjoyment was permissive, that the wall is a party-wall. In
such cases the law presumes an agreement between tile adjacent owners that the
wall shall be held and enjoyed as the common property of both.
An action was brought to recover damages for injuries done to the plaintiff's
house by the careless and negligent manner in which the house of the defenmant,
next adjoining, was improved, and for the direct losses consequent upon such injuries, sustained by the plaintiff in his trade and business. The plaintiff's house
was injured by the partial falling in of the division wall between the two houses ;
and this was caused by digging too near the wall for the purpose of deepening the
cellar under the defendant's house. No notice was given by the defendant of his
intention to deepen the cellar, and evidence was offered to show that the excavation was done in a careless and negligent manner. Evidence was also offered to
chow that the business of the plaintiff, who kept an ice-cream saloon and made
cakes and other articles in that line, was interrupted for several days : Held,
That the plaintiff was entitled to recover such damages as would be sufficient
to reinstate the wall, and the house in as good condition as they were prior to
the injury, and to compensate him for the loss consequent upon the interruption
of his business.

BROWN v. WERNER.
Where a builder or contractor selects his own workmen and has the immediate
control over the work, and directs the manner in which it shall be done, such
buildcr or contractor is responsible for injuries resulting from the careless and
negligent manner in which the work is done.
In an action to recover damages for injuries done the plaintiff's house by the
careless and negligent manner in which the defendant's house, next adjoining, was
improved, it is competent for the plaintiff to introduce evidence to show the usual

profits of his business prior to the injuries, the declaration having alleged that the
house was so injured as to prevent the plaintiff from carrying on his business for
several days, whereby he sustained loss and damage, &c.-such allegation is a
distinct claim for damages consequent upon the interruption of the plaintiff's trade
and business by the wrongful act of the defendant.

from the Superior Court of Baltimore city.
This suit was brought to recover damages for injuries done
to the appellee's house on East Baltimore street, by the careless and negligent manner in which the house of the appellant Otto, next adjoining, was improved; and for the direct losses
consequent upon such injuries sustained by the appellee in his
trade and business.
The appellee's house was injured by the partial falling in of the
division wall between the two houses,, and this was caused by digging too near said wall, for the purpose of deepening the cellar
under Otto's house. No notice was given by the appellant, Otto,
of his intention to deepen the cellar, and evidence was offered to
show that the excavation was done in a careless and negligent
manner. The appellee's house was built more than twenty-five
years before the injuries complained of, and during all this time,
the division wall had been used for the common support of the two
houses, the joists of the appellee's house resting upon the wall.
The plaintiff also offered in evidence, a deed of the property, one
of the boundaries in which, it was stated, called for the division
wall in question.
APPEAL

William A. Stewart, for the appellants, cited, Washburne on
Easements 451; 2 Washburn on Real Prop. 77; 2 Bouvier's Inst.,
sec. 1615; Mayne on Darhages 237; Jones v. Gooday, 8 Mees.
& Wels. 146 ; ffosking v. Phillips, 3 Exch. 168.
Oharle8 G. Kerr and IReverdy Johnson, for the appellee, referred to 3 Kent's Comm. 437, 488; Washburne on Easements and
Servitudes 454; Wyatt v. Harrison,3 Barn. & Ad. 871; Dodd v.
ifolme, 1 Adol. & Ellis 493.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROBINSON, J.-The court instructed the jury, that if they should
find the wall between the two houses to be a party-wall, and that
the defendant Otto employed the defendant Brown to improve his
building, and with a view to such improvement, without giving notice
to the plaintiff of such intention, the cellar of Otto's house was dug
below the foundation, and that the same was done so carelessly and
negligently, that portions of the said wall fell in, and caused injury
to other portions of thesaid wall of the plaintiff's house, and hazarded
the falling in of the entire wall, so as to make the occupation of
the plaintiff's house dangerous, and that lie was for some days
unable to carry on his business, then the plaintiff was entitled to
recover such damages as would enable him to reinstate the wall and
house itself, in as good condition as they were before the injury,
and as would compensate him for the loss consequent upon the
interruption of his business.
To the granting of this instruction, and to the refusal to grant
the several prayers offered by them, the defendants excepted.
The court's instruction is objected to in the first place, on the
ground that there was no evidence from which the jury could find
the wall between the houses, was a party-wall, but it does not
appear from the record, that this objection was made below, and
it cannot therefore be made in this court. The question, however,
is presented by the defendants' second and fourth prayers, anil it
becomes necessary for us to determin-e whether there was any evidence from which the jury could find the wall to be a party-wall.
The appellants contend that there was not, because the appellee's
deed shows, that the wall was built exclusively upon the land of
the appellant Otto. Without attempting a precise definition of
the term "party-wall," it is sufficient to say, tha-t ordinarily it
means a wall built partly on the land of one and partly on the hind
of another, for the common benefit of both, in supporting timbers,
used in the construction of contiguous buildings. If the character
of the wall in question depended solely upon the appellee's (Iced,.
there might be some ground for the appellant's contention. But a
division wall may become a party-wall by agreement, either actual
or presunmed, and although such wall may have been built exclusively upon the land of one, if it has been used and enjoyed in
common by the owners of both houses for a period of twenty years,
the law will presume in the absence of evidence showing that such
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use and enjoyment was permissive, that the wall is a party-wall.
In such cases the law presumes an agreement between the adjacent
owners, that the wall shall be held and enjoyed as the common
property of both. In Dowling et al. v. Hennings, 20 Md. 184,
this court said: "From our examination of the authorities bearing upon the question under consideration, we have concluded that
the uninterrupted enjoyment and use of the alley and alley walls
for the period shown by the evidence, raises the presumption of
mutual grants for such enjoyment for the time the two houses
should be capable of safe and beneficial occupation, and that the
appellants had no authority to interfere with the alley or walls,
without the consent of the appellee, unless he could do so without
injury to his possession :" Brown v. Windsor, 1 Cromp. & Jer.
20; Eno v. Del Vecchio, 6 Duer 17 ; Campbell v. Aesier, 4 Johns.
Oh. 834.
In this case, the wall in question, was a common nine inch division wall between the two houses, and it appears that the appellee's
house was built into and rested upon said wall, and that this user
and enjoyment had continued for more than twenty years. In the
absence then of evidence, to show that this user was by license
merely, we think there was proof from which the jury might find
it to be a party-wall.
The rule in regard to the measure of damages, was correctly laid
down by the -court. The action was for a tort, and the plaintiff was
entitled to recover for all damages naturally or necessarily flowing
from the wrongful acts of the defendants; and if his house was injured by the careless and negligent manner in which the appellants improved the adjoining house, he was entitled to recover such
damages as would be sufficient to reinstate the wall and the house
in as good condition as they were prior to the injury.
The fifth prayer was properly refused. It asserts as a proposition of law, that if Otto, the owner of the house, and Brown, the
contractor,employed skilful persons to dig the cellar, and underpin the wall, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover: in other
words, that he must look to the excavator and bricklayer for damages, if any were sustained. No authority was referred to, nor
have we been able to find any, in support of this proposition. On
the contrary, we take the law to be well settled, that where a
builder or contractor selects his own workmen and has the immediate control over, and directs the manner in which the work shall
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be done, such builder or contractor is responsible for injuries resulting from the careless and negligent manner in which the work is
done.
Evidence was offered by the plaintiff to maintain the issue on his
part, and testifying in his own behalf, stated that lie kept an ice
cream saloon, and made cakes and other articles in that line. His
counsel then asked him the following question : "What were the
u~ual profits of your business before the accident occurred ?" The
court permitted the question to be asked.
The question was properly admitted. It is objected to on the
ground that the declaration does not claim damages for losses sustained by the plaintiff in the interruption of his trade and business. In this we do not concur. It charges the defendants not
only with injuring the house of the plaintiff, but so injuring it
"as to prevent him from carrying on his business for several days.
Here
* * * whereby the plaintiff sustained loss and damage, &e."
is a direct allegation that his business was interrupted by the
wrongful acts of the defendants, and a claim for damages on account
of same.
Judgment affirmed.
STEWART, J., dissented.

Supreme Judicial Court of New Tampshire.
JEWELL v. GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY.
Common carriers are bound to deliver freight, consigned to them for transporta
tion, at a place suitable and reasonable for the consignee to reccive it ; and
whether any given place answers this requirement is a question for the jury, under
proper instructions from the court.
The rule would be the same if their liability as common carriers had ended,
and the goods remained in their possession as warehousemen or depositaries.
The liability of a master for the negligence of his servants extends only to such
acts or omissions as come within the scope of the servant's employment. Therefore, where the servant of a railway corporation, not having authority frnom the
corporation to employ other servants, engaged one G. to assist him in movius a
crate of crockery, and, through the negligence or inefficiency of G., combined
with the carelessness of the servant, the crate was overturned, striking the plaintiff, whereby it was claimed he suffered a severe injury-Held, That the coiporation was not liable for the negligence of G., nor for the fault of their servant in
employing G. to assist him, even admitting G. to have been an unsuitable and improper person to engage for that service
If the consignee of goods accepts a delivery at a place or in a manner different
from what a common carrier is liable by law to deliver them, the business of re-
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moving them becomes from that time his businesq, and the carrier cannot be held
liable for the acts or omissions of those emnloyed to do the work.
When the duty of a common carrier as to the delivery of freight hns ended, no
custom or practice of his servant in assisting consignees in moving or loading their
goods can affect the principal.,

CASE, commenced in the lifetime of Levi D. Jewell, who died
before the trial, to recover damages for a personal injury to the _
deceased alleged to have been caused by the carelessness and
neglect of Thomas 'Monneghan, an employee of the defendants, in
wheeling out and placing upon the platform of the defendants'
freight-house, at Gorham, N. H., a crate of crockery belonging to
C. L. Plaisted, of Jefferson. Plea, the general issue.
The plaintiff, who was the widow of the deceased, and was his
wife at the time of the injury, was offered as a witness by her
counsel. The defendants objected to her testifying on the ground
of incompetency, but the court allowed her to testify; to which the
.defendants excepted. The court was of the opinion (and so stated)
that her examination would not (and it did not) lead to any violation of marital confidence.
It appeared that on November 24th 1869, the deceased was in
the employ of Mr. Thompson, of the Glen House, who sent him on
that day with a four-horse team to the defendants' depot, at Gorham, to obtain some freight. When he arrived at the freighthouse, he found the team of Mr. Plaisted backed up to the platform at a point nearly opposite the freight-louse door, and two men
in Plaisted's employ were there. Said Jewell backed his team up
to the platform from four to six feet to the right of Plaistetl's team,
and, upon his freight being pointed out to him bysaid Monneghan,
he took it and loaded it into his wagon. Plaisted's freight consisted of said crate of crockery, weighing 620 lbs., and several
smaller articles, which Monneghan had pointed out to his men
(Otis A. Garland and John Nqutter) inside the freight-house, and
which, with the exception of the crate, they had taken and loaded.
Garland requested Monneghan to assist in wheeling the crate to
the platform. He did so, using a pair of low warehouse truicks,
Monneghan wheeling the trucks and Garland steadying the crate
as it moved along. In unloading it from the trucks on to the
platform, the crate tipped over, and one corner of it hit Jewell on
his right shoulder and injured him. Said Jewell was then standing upon the ground between the platform and the hind end.of his
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wagon adjusting the tail-board, the space between being just wide
enough for him to stand in. The platform was about eight feet
wide, and as Jewell stood on the ground it was nearly as high as
his shoulders. The bottom of his wagon was about on a level with
the platform. The crate was about 41 feet long, 3 feet wide, and
2 or 2.! feet thick, and was loaded lengthwise upon the trucks, and, in
unloading it, it was necessary to set it upon the end. In so doing
Garland attempted to hold it, but in consequence of the carelessness of Monneghan in depositing it upon the platform, or of the
inefficiency of Garland in holding it, or for both of these reasons,
it went over, hitting Jewell as before stated, and leaving about 4
inches of the crate projecting beyond the edge of the platform.
Plaisted's freight arrived at Gorham depot the preceding day, and
was taken out of the cars and set apart for him, or placed for safe
keeping in the defendants' freight-house, about 30 feet from where
his wagon stood at the time of the injury, and about 18 feet from the
door, and remained there until it was pointed out to his men by
Monneghan. It did not appear that any goods or other obstruction was between Plaisted's freight and the place where his wagon
stood. Monneghan was employed as porter for the defendants
about the station at Gorham, and had been for many years. His
duty in regard to freight was to unload it from the cars, put it in
some convenient place inside the freight-house, keeping each man's
freight by itself, and when called for to point it out to the consignee
and deliver it, so far as the defendants were bound in law to deliver
it, either at that point or upon the platform outside or elsewhere.
Thomas II. Cooper, the defendants' superintendent, testified that
it was no part of Monneghan's duty or service for the defendants
to deliver freight upon the platform, or to load it for the consignees, but he did not deny that it was Monneghan's duty to do
whatever it was incumbent on the defendants to do in the matter
of delivering freight at Gorham.
The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that it was the ordinary
custom of Monneghan to move heavy articles like this crate of
crockery from inside the freight-house to the platform when they
were called for, and deliver them there; but the defendants' evidence tended to show that, at the request of the consignees, when
not otherwise engaged, he had occasionally assisted in moving such
articles. The plaintiff did not claim that the defendants were
bound. to furnish assistance in loading this crate upon Mr. Plaisted's team.
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Upon the question of liability, the defendants' counsel requested'
the court to instruct the jury,1. That if Plaisted's freight was received at the Gorham depot,
unloaded, and carefully set aside in the defendants' warehouse, in
a place reasonably accessible to the owner when called for, and the
same was pointed out to-him when called for, the defendants'
duty as to making delivery of the same, or of forwarding it further,
was at an end; that the defendants were under no legal obligation
to deliver it upon the platform outside of their warehouse, or
to load it upon the consignee's wagon, and cannot be held liable
for Monneghan's acts in wheeling out the crate of crockery to
the platform after pointing it out as aforesaid, as this would be
no service the defendants had contracted or were bound to do for
Plaisted ; that in doing this service, Monneghan would not be the
servant of the defendants.
2. That in order to hold the defendants liable, the jury must
find that Monneghan was their servant, an(, in performing the act
of wheeling the crate of crockery to the platform, was acting within
the scope of his employment as such servant, and that his carelessness as such servant in wheeling or in unloading said crate caused
it to tip over and injure the deceased.
3. That the defendants are not liable for any negligence or carelessness of said Garland; that he was not the servant of the defendants, and they are in no respect liable for his acts.
4. That even if the defendants were bound as a matter of law
to deliver Plaisted's freight on the platform, still, lie or his teamster might, if he chose, receive the delivery of it, inside the freighthouse ; that the testimony of Garland and Monneghan is competent
evidence from which the jury may find that the Plaisted freight was
in fact delivered and accepted in the freight-house ; and if it was thus
delivered and accepted, then the question whether or not the defendants were bound to deliver it on the platform or elsewhere does
not arise in the case, and the jury need not consider that matter at
all ; and in such case Mlonneghan's act in wheeling out and assisting in unloading the crate would be his own voluntary matter, the
defendants not being responsible even if he was careless in doing it.
The court did not give these instructions except in a modified
form as indicated in the opinion. The jury were instructed to
answer certain questions, which are also sufficiently indicated in
the opinion.
VOL. XXIII.-46
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The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, assessing damages at
$960, which the defendants moved to set aside; and the questions
arising on that motion were reserved.
Burns ,J-lcyuood (with whom was Twitehell), for the plaintiff,
citcd Sedgwick on the Measure of Damages 654, note; Illinois
Central -R. B. v. Barren, 5 Wall. 90.
Ray J- Drew (with whom was C. A. Binghzam), for the deR., 32 N. 11. 523; Smith v.
. Rl/-.
fendants, cited Moses v. B.
. J L. R. .L, 27 N. II. 86; Flower v. Adam, 2 Taunt. 314;
M1arble v. WIoreester, 4 Gray 395-397 ; Cook v. (harlestown, 98
Mass. 80; Tutebn v. Hurley, 98 Mass. 211.
SIiTHi, J.-The defendants' first request for instructions to the
jury was properly refused. It assumes, as a matter of law, that
the warehouse was a reasonable place to require ilaisted to accept
the delivery of his freight. The instructions of the court were, in
substance, that the defendants were not bound, as a matter of law,
to deliver the crate upon the platform outside the freight-house,
neither had they a right, as a matter of law, to deposit it in the
freight-house and compel Plaisted to receive it there; but they
were bound to deliver the freight in a convenient and suitable place
in which it was reasonable for them to compel Plaisted to receive
it, which might be inside the freight-house, or upon the platform
outside, or elsewhere. It is a question for the jury, under the circuinstances of each particular case, to say what, under proper inand
structions from the court, would be reasonable in this respect,
liable
were
defendants
the
this irrespective of the question whether
to IPlaisted as common carriers, or depositaries. I do not think it
this
necessary to inquire whether the defendants, at the time of
or
capacity
one
accident to Jewell, were liable to Plaisted in the
were
they
the other ; for in whichever capacity they were liable
by
bound to deliver the goods to Plaisted. This might have been
pointing them out to him in their warehouse, provided that were
reasonable; or it might have been by delivering them elsewhere,
provided that were reasonable, as the jury might find. The period
very
when the liability of railroads as common carriers ends was
H.
N.
32
Railroad,
1aine
&
Boston
v.
fully discussed in Moses
in
discussed
fully
also
was
523, and their liability as depositaries

JEWELL v. GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY.

Sm iti v. Nashua . Lowell Railroad, 27 N. II. 86 ; and we see no
occasion to review the law as laid down in those cases. •
The defendants' second and third requests for instructions were
substantially granted in the instructions by the presiding justice to
the jury; but the qualification, that the defendants would be liable
if Monneghan, in the exercise of ordinary care, ought to have
selected a fitter person, and ought not to have permitted Garland
to assist him, if they should find the accident was owing to the carelessness of Garland, I think was erroneous.
The declaration
alleges an injury done the plaintiff by the defendants' servant,
Monneghan, in carelessly wheeling out and placing on the platform
the crate of crockery. There is no allegation that it was done by
Garland, or that Garland was a servant of the defendants, or that
the defendants, or their servant Monneghan, were guilty of negligence in procuring or permitting Garland to aid in the removal of
the crate. Alhd if it had been properly alleged that the defendants' servant, Monneghan, was guilty of negligence in procuring
an unsuitable person to assist in the removal, I think the cause
would be too remote. The proximate cause of the injury would be
Garland's negligence. The allegation would be for a cause that
created a cause that did tile injury,-that is, that Monneghan's
negligence employed Garland, a negligent person, who committed
the wrong or injury through negligence. It is not necessary to
enlarge upon the rule of very general application in the law, "In
jure, causaproxima, 2on rernota, sectatur," nor upon the maxim
of the schoolmen. " JCausa causantis, causa est eausati," further
than to add, in tile words of SHAw, C. J., : "The law looks to a
practical rule, adapted to the rights and duties of all persons in
society, in the common and ordinary concerns of actual and real
life; and, on account of the difficulty in unravelling a combination
of causes, and of tracing each result, as a matter of fict, to its true,
real, and efficient cause, the law has adopted the rule, before stated,
of regarding the proximate and not the remote cause of the occurrence which is the subject of inquiry :" Marble v. Worcester, 4 Gray
395; Cook v. Charlestown, 98 Mass. 80; Tutein v. Hurley. Id.
211.
The jury, by their answer to the fourth question, found that
the accident was the result of the joint negligence of Monneghan
and Garland. But, having failed to agree upon an answer to the
fifth question, whether there was any want of ordinary care on the
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part of Monneghan in not having a more suitable person than he
did to assist him in moving the crate, the defendants claim that a
verdict should have been ordered for them, because it does not
appear that the negligence of Monneghan alone, in wheeling the
crate, was sufficient to cause the accident, and because they are
made liable for the negligent act of Garland, or the joint negligence of Garland and Monneghan. It is true that there was no
special finding of the jury upon the question of whether Momghan's negligence was sufficient; and, had a general verdict been
ordered by the court, it might have been necessary to set the verdict aside. But the ca-5e states that the jury found a verdict for
the plaintiff; and I think it must follow that it was found on
account of the negligent act of Monneghan, and that his negligence
alone was sufficient to cause the injury. The instructions of the
court were that they must find, in order to entitle the plaintiff to
recover, that Monneghan's carelessness, in wheeling or unloading
the crate, caused it to tip over and injure the deceased ; and that
the defendants were not liable for the neglect or carelessness of
Garland, except as before stated.
As the verdict is to be set aside upon another ground, the
question is only important in the event of a new trial.
We think the instructions asked by the defendants in their fourth
request should have been given.
It was the duty of the defendants to transport the goods, and
deliver them to Plaisted from their cars or at their freight-house.
But the duty might be modified as to the manner of its performance. The general duty of the defendants as common carriers was,
to make a true delivery of the goods at the usual place, which was
from their cars or at their depot; but we think it must be entirely
clear that it was competent for Plaisted to assent to a delivery elsewhere, and if lie accepted the delivery of his goods elsewhere he
thereby assumed the further responsibility, and the defendants
were exempted from the duty of making any other or different
delivery: Lewis v. Western Ifail'oad, 11 Met. 509. In that case,
it is remarked by DEWEY, J., : " Suppose a bale of goods was transported by them [the defendant railroad], and on its arrival at the
depot the owner should step into the car and ask for a delivery
there, and thereupon the goods shofild be passed over to him in the
car: the delivery would be pes'fect; and, if any casualty should subsequently occur in taking out the bale, the loss would be his. The
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place and manner of delivery may always be varied with the assent
of the owner of the property ; and, if lie interferes to control or
direct in the matter, he assumes the responsibility."
In the case at bar, when Plaisted's team came for his goods, the
several packages were pointed out to his servants, Garland and
Nutter, by Monneghan, the servant of the defendants, inside the
freight-house.
So far as the case finds, no claim was made by them that the
place inside where the goods were deposited was not convenient
and suitable, or that they were entitled to have the goods delivered
to them upon the platform outside; but they took and loaded all
the articles except the crate. That they did this, and did not call
upon Monneghan to do it, or claim that he should deliver the
goods outside upon the platform, was evidence for the jury to find
an acceptance of them by Plaisted's servants inside. Garland then
requested Monneghan to assist in wheeling the crate to the platform. This request was also evidence, from which it was competent
for the jury to find a delivery accepted inside. It is true that the
jury answered the ninth question, "Did the man to whom Plaisted intrusted the duty of going for his goods undertake to accept
the crate inside the depot, or to relieve the defendants from any
duty which they were bound to perform in relation to its delivery ?" in the negative; but the case also finds that the court
"did not instruct the jury that their finding upon the ninth
question would be in any way material in the decision of the
cause."
I think here was evidence from which the jury might have found
a delivery and acceptance of the goods inside the freight-house, and
that the defendants' request should have been granted. If the instructions asked for had been given, and if the court had instructed
the jury in what respect their finding " would be material in the
decision of the cause," their finding upon the ninth question might
have been different. However that may be, the defendants were
entitled to have the jury properly instructed on this point ; and
because they were not, the verdict must be set aside.
It necessarily follows, that if there was a delivery and acceptance of the goods inside the depot, Monneghan's act, in wheeling
out and assisting in unloading the crate at the request of Plaisted
or his servants, would be his own voluntary matter, and the defendants would ndt be responsible for his negligence.

JEWELL v. GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY.

The jury were also instructed, that "if it was Monneghan's
ordinary custom, when heavy freight like this crate of crockery
was called for by the consignees after it had been deposited in the
freight-house, to remove it to the platform outside, then this would
become the service of the defendants, even if their duty had ceased
as to the delivery of the goods." We are unable to assent to the
law as here laid down. The terms "custom" and " usage " are
often used indifferently. "Their true office is, to interpret the
otherwise indeterminate intentions of parties, and to ascertain the
nature and extent of their contract, arising not from express stipulation, but from mere implications and presumptions and acts of a.
doubtful and equivocal character," &c. : 2 Greenl. E v., sec. 251.
Evidence of Monneghan's custom in this respect was admissible, as
showing the nature of the defendants' contracts as to the transportation and delivery of freight, and as bearing upon the particular
mode and place of delivery of heavy freight, and, as the plaintiff's
counsel says in his brief, is evidence of the extent of Monneghan's
services. But still it is a question of fact for the jury to say, upon
all the evidence and circumstances in the case, including the evidence of custom, what the defendants' contract or undertaking, as
to the mode and place of delivery of freight, was. But the instructions went further than this, and the jury were told that the ordinary custom of I\onneghan to remove heavy freight from the inside
to the platform outside, even after the defendants' duty had ceased
as to the delivery of the goods, would become the service of the defendants. It is difficult to see how, after the defendants' duty had
ceased as to the delivery ot freight, any custom or practice of
Mlonneghan's in assisting consignees in moving or loading their
goods, can affect the defendants. The defendants are only responsible for their servant's acts when acting within the line of his
duty, and within the line of their duty to their consignees. When
that duty has ended, they are no more responsible for his acts and
doings than for the acts and doings of any other person.
The plaintiff was properly admitted to testify-Gen. Stats., cb.
209, see. 20-except so far as would lead to the violation of marital
confidence-Id. see. 21; but as no marital confidence was violated,
no exception lies to the admission of her testimony.
Verdict set aside and new trial ordered.

i:
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United States Court of Claims.
JOIN KNOTE v. TIE UNITED STATES.
Under the Constitution the President's power of pardon does not include the
power to restore property forfeited to the United States.
At common law the power of the sovereign to restore forfeitures wit incident
to his title as lord paramount, and extended only to property in which no other
title than his had vested. His power to pardon on the contrary was a part of' the
public prerogative, and included the power to release all the consequences whieh
attached to the crime subsequent to the date of the pardon. The restoration of fir.
feited property was not an incident to pardon, and the two powers had no other
connection than the fact of being lodged in the same person.
In the United States the power to pardon and to restore forfeited property are
vested in different parts of the government, the former in the President, aml the
latter in Congress under its general and exclusive power to dispose of the property
of the United States.
The President's proclamation of pardon and amnesty, made December 25th
1868, did not have the effect of entitling a citizen whose property had been theretofore condemned and forfeited for treason, and the proceeds paid into the United
States treasury, to a restoration of such property or indemnification by the United
States.

Turs was a petition setting forth that the petitioner was a citizen of'
Wheeling, West Virginia; that certain specified personal property of
his was seized and libelled on the ground of his alleged treason and rebellion, and by the decree of the United States District Court for the district and state of West Virginia was condemned and forfeited to the
United States under the Act of July 17th 1862, and sold, and the net
proceeds, amounting to $11.000, were paid into the treasury; that by
virtue of the President's proclamation of December 25th 1868, the petitioner was pardoned and released of all disabilities and penalties attaching to the offence of treason and rebellion for which said property was
conflicated, and by virtue thereof has been restored to all his rights,
privileges or immunities under the Constitution df the United States
and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and that he is entitled to receive from the United States the said proceeds of sale ; and he prayed
judgment for $11,000.
The defendants filed a general demurrer to the petition, and on that
issue was joined and the cae argued and submitted to the court.

Linden Kent and Th. Jesup .Miller, for petitioner, cited Ex parte
Garland,4 Wall. 480; Story on the Const. § 1504; U S. v. Letncastane
rx Wells,
ter, 4 Wash. C. C. 66; U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 161 ;
18 How. 307; U. S. v. Harris,1 Abbott C. C. 114; Viner's Abr. tit.
Prerogative; 3 Coke's Inst, ch. 105; Armstrong's case, 6 Wall. 768;
Brown v. U. S., MeCahon 231; Burton v. Smith, 13 Pet. 364.
Goforth and Blair, for the United States.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
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LORING, J.-The learned counsel for the petitioner in their argument
referred us for the construction of the word " pardon" in the second
section or the second article of the Constitution to the following sentences of' Chief Justice I.t.RSHALL in United States v. Wilson, 7 Peters
150 : The Constitution gives to the President, in general terms, the
power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United
States. As this power had been exercised from time immemorial by the
executive of that nation whose language is our language, and to whose
judicial institutions ours bear so close resemblance, we adopt their principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon, and look into
their books for the rules prescribing the nanner in which it is to be
used by the person who would avail himself of it."
On this authority the word " pardon" in the Constitution is to be construed according to its signification in English law at the time the Constitution was adopted. And the question is, what was that signification ?
By the theory of the English government the king was lord paramount, fron whom all lands were held in such estates as he pleased to
grant, on the condition of service to him.
Lord Coi:1E says : " All the lands within the realm were originally derived from the king, and thiertfore the king is sovereign lord, or lord
paramount, either mediate or immediate, of all and every parcel of land
within the realn :" 1 Inst.
And the services on which the grants of estates by the king were
conditioned always included homage and fealty, so that treason was a
breach of the condition upon which the lands were held, by which
breach the lands were fbrfbited to the king and thus returned to him by
the necessary operation of a condition at the common law.
The effect was, that the treason annulled the tenant's estate, which
fell from the lands and left the original title of the king as it was before
the estate was granted, and free of the encumbrance which the grant of
it created. And in this the kin- derived nothing of title from the tenant; but merely held the land by his own original title as lord paramount, and simply as crown lands. And of these, Blackstone says:
"The demesne lands, terrce domziicales yegis, being either. the share
reserved to the crow'n, at the original distribution of landed property,
or such as has come to him by forfeitures or otherwise :" 1 Com. 286.
I have cited Blackstone's Commentaries, because that work was contemporaneous with our Constitution, and brought the law of England
down to that day ; and then as now was the authoritative text-book
on its subject, familiar not only to the profession but to all men of the
general education of the founders of our Constitution. Mr. Burke. in
his speech "on conciliation with America," delivered in March 1775,
referring to information derived from "1an eminent bookseller." as to
the great exportation of law-books to this country, says: "The colonists
have -now fhllen into the way of printing them for themselves. I hear
that they have sold nearly as many of Blaekstone's Commentaries in
America as in England." That book, therefore, thus belongs to the precise time to which our question relates, and is especially authoritative
on its subject, and therefore I shall continue to cite it.
The title of the crown lands being thus in the king could be divested
from him only as other titles were divested, by the grant of the owner.
And the king, like other owners, was free to grant them to whom he
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pleased, and, therefore, might grant them again to their former tenant,
who had foribited them, or to any other person, as he pleased. And so
he might grant what estate in them he pleased, and that absolutely or
conditionally, as he pleased ; and in this there was no connection with
or recourse to til power to pardon, for itwas the necessary result of
title and the rules of tenure in the English feudal law.
And it is observable that that system was not, like the civil law, a
system of jurisprudence foutided on the principles of natural equity, but
a state policy, and conventional merely, Its purpose was the establishment of government on the tenure of land, which was then the only permanent means of men's support. For mere personalty was then of little
comparative value; it consisted chiefly of food, clothing and arms ; and
was perishable in its nature and consumed in its use. It was, therefbre,
in legal language, incapable of a limitation over. And as it thus could
not further the purpose of the system, it was little regarded in its law,
but held to be merely an incident to tenure, and following its results.
Thus Sir Charles Yorke, in his " Considerations on the law of' frlbiture
by treason," says as follows " Goods and personal things. They were
taken to be the produce of the feud and belonging to it, and were forfeitable in whole or in part for offences of inferior moment :" P. 69.
Such, in brief, is the theory and the history of forfeitures of lands
and goods in the early English law, and of that title to them in tie king
by which, and by which alone, he could grant them to whom he pleased
and as lie pleased. And the doctrine of the restoration of forfeitures
had then, and has now, no other foundation.
Blaekstone brings this ancient law down to the time of our Constitution, and distinguishes carefully between the ordinary and the extraordinary revenue of the crown. The latter, the extraordinary revenue,
were grants of Parliament for the general expenses of the national government and could be disposed of only according to the Act of Parliawent. The ordinary revenue was, in the expressive phrase of Blackstone, " the proper royal patrimony." and, as such, disposable by the
royal grant. He thus defines it: - The revenue is either ordinary or
extraordinary. The king's ordinary revenue is such as has either subsisted time out of mind intile crown, or else has been granted by Parliament by way of purchase or exchange for such of the king's hereditary
revenues as were found inconvenient to the subject :" 1 Com. 251.
And necessarily that which had been an exchange for any part of the
hereditary revenue of the crown stood in its place, as part of the royal
patrimony, and subject to its incidents.
And of this " ordinary revenue" of the crown, or " proper royal patrimony," which had subsisted time out of mind in the king, Blaekstone
states eighteen sources, such as the revenues of vacant sees, first fruits'
of spiritual preferments, rents of crown lands, mines of gold and silver,
wrecks, waif', treasure-trove, royal fish, deodands and forfeitures," &c.
And of these last, Blackstone says : " 16th. The next branch of the ordinary revenue of the king consists in forfeitures of lands and goods
for offences." And after stating time general ground of forfeitures, lie
says: " Hence in every offence of an atrocious kind the laws of' England
have exacted a total confiscation of the movables or personal estate, and
inmany cases a perpetual, in others only a temporary, loss of the offender's
jaimvables or landed property; and have vested both of them in the
VOL. XXIII-47

KNOTE v. THE UNITED STATES.

king. who is the person supposed to be offended, being the one visible
magistrate in whoin the majesty of the public resides :" 1 Com. 299.
And as this "ordinary revenue" belongs to the king in exclusive
title, he consequently, and he only, may dispose of it. And from the
earliest timles such ordinary revenue has been the means of royal grants,
and constituted the royal franchises of English law. Blackstone says
(I Coin. S02): "Deodands and forl'oitures in general, as well as wrecks,
treasure trove, royal fish, mines, wails and estrays, may be granted by
the kig,,to particular subjects as a royal franchise."
And it is a natter of familiar history that these grants of the sources
of the ordinary revenue of the crown were so lavishly made by successive kings, who, for their purposes, squandered the patrimony of their
successors, as to impoverish the crown and reduce it to dependence on
P'arliament. And to save whiat remained of the royal inheritance, in
the firbt year of Queen Anne's reign an act was passed restricting royal
grants ot crown lands. But from this act forfiitures were expressly
excepted, so that these remained, as at the common law, in the king's
exclusive control.
This history of the ordinary revenue of the crown, "1the proper royal
patrimony," shows that the title to forfeitures of realty and personalty
is vested in the king. exactly as is the title to the other specified sources
of his ordinary revenue. And as a consequence of such title he may
dispose of any or all of them as he pleases, and, therefore, his power of
disposing of forfitures is no more inherent in or pertaining to his power
to pardon than is his power to dispose of waifs, or wrecks, or deodands,
or royal fish.
And in the English law all the text-books from Coke to Blackstone
and since refer the king's power to restore forfeitures to his title ; and
by that all the rules relating to the restoration of forfeitures are shaped.
Lord COKE, in defining pardons, says: "A pardon is a work of mercy,
whereby the king, either befbre attainder and sentence or conviction,
or after, forgiveth any crime, offence, punishment, execution, right, title
or debt, or duty, either temporal or ecclesiastical. All that is forfeited
to the king he may restore by his charter." And this directly refers
his power to restore to his title, for it limits it to that : 3 Inst. 233,
Pardon.
And under the head of restitution Lord COKE says as follows: "1And
the reason wherefore the king may by his charter pardon the execution
and restore to the party or his heirs the land forfeited by his attainder,
and remaining in the crown, is for that no person hath thereby any
prejudice."
Here, again, the restoration of the forfeiture is referred to
title merely, for what is his own the king can convey, because it affects
only himself; and Lord COKE in express words confines the restoration
to the property" remaining in the crown :" 3 Inst. 240, Restitution.
And because the king's power to restore results only from his title, it
has always been the law in England, as it is now, that where a statute
vests the forfeiture or any part of it in the subject, the king can restore
only his own, and cannot restore what the law has given to the informer.
Hawkins's P. C. 548, says : " I take it to be a settled rule that the king
cannot, by any dispensation, release, pardon or grant whatever, bar any
right, whether of entry or action, or any legal interest, benefit or advantage whatsoever, before vested in the subject."
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And by the common law, title can be divested only by some mode or
form of conveyance or transfer, and where that is in writing it must
contain words of donation manifesting the intent to convey and efficient
for it. And hence the rule is, and always has been, that a pardon, to
affect a restoration of a forfeiture, must contain words of restitution,
and thus be expressly a grant of property as well as the pardon of a
crime. And unless such express words of restitution are contained in
the pardon it is not a grant Of property, but a pardon of a crime merely.
And the only reason for the requirement of words of restitution is
that the title and ownership of the property are in the king. For if
they were not his, words of restitution would be of no avail. And the
rule is referred to here only to show that such title and ownership were
in the kiug, in the English law.
A leading case for the rule was cited by the learned counsel for the
government, from 1 Lev. 120. It is better reported by a better anthority, 1 Saunders 862. In that case Toombes' administrator, brought
a scirefaciasagainst Edherington on a judgment for 20001. 2s. recovered
against him by the intestate. The defendant pleaded that the intestate,
after the rendition of the judgment, committed suicide, and was found
fein (7e se, and his goods were forfeited to the king. The replication
was the Act of 12 Car. 2, e. 11, " of free pardon, indemnity and oblivion," subsequent to the suicide, whereby the judgment of 20101. 2s.
was discharged from any forfeiture. Judgment was rendered for the
defendant. And the court said as follows: " Whed the inquisition was
returned to the King's Bench which found the felony of himself, then
were the debt and damages vested in the king, and by the act lie has
not granted restitution of it to the plaintiff, administrator. And for
want of restitution the plaintiff cannot have it, and it remains in the
king."
And the note by Saunders shows that the king brought a scirefacias
on the judgment against Etherington, and he pleaded the same act of
"free pardon, indemnity and oblivion," of 12 Oh. 2, c. 11, which contained words of release of all judgments, &c. And the court held that
such words of release discharged the judgment itself, and released the
debtor from it. And this shows thit the restoration of property is not
the legal incident of pardon, for by the same Act of Parliament the
pardon of the offence went to one man and the grant or release of property to another.
There is but one case in the English law where the restoration of
property follows a pardon, and there it is not incident to it but only
accompanies it; and that is in the case of excusable homicide, under
the Statute of Gloucester, which was in affirmanee of the common law,
and prescribes the proceedings, where it is found by verdict that the
homicide was in self-defence or by mere accident. In the earliest practice, on such a verdict the prisoner was remanded to jail to await the
king's grace. Later the practice was to certify the verdict into chancery, and thereupon the chancellor, as a matter of course, and without
submitting the case to the king, issued a writ for the pardon of the
prisoner and the restoration of the property forfeited. And afterward,
to save the cost and delay of these mere forms, the modern practice was
adopted, in which the courton the verdict render a judgent of acquittal, which prevents the forfeiture. Of course the case was exceptional,
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for in it there was no guilt; and Blackstone, after speaking of the
ancient practice, says as follows (4 Com. 1SS): "The delinquent has
now. andl has had as early its our records will reach, a pardon and restitution of his goods as a matter of course and riglht."
And lIawkins (P. C. 530) says of the practice in his time and before,
as fillows: " However, it seems to have been always agreed that the
firl'.it
ure of goods, by such homicide. may be saved by a pardon.(which
in this particular case scens to purge the guilt ab initio "). This is a
clear implication that in his day in other cases pardon did not purge
the guilt ab initio, but only exempted from the punishment. And it
shows also]how much less effect was then given to a pardon in authoritative text-books ott the criminal law than is now often claimed for it in
modcrn American decisions. and how gradually it has reached the
uttost effect now given it in English text-books, of removing disabilities
and prosecution from and after the pardon. Mr. Russell, in his textbook ott criminal law, vol. 1 (p. 975, Cr. Law) says as follows: " It was
formerly doubted whether a pardon could do more than take away the
punishtment, but it is now settled that a pardon. whether by the kittg or
Act of Parliament, removes not only the punishment but allthe legal
disabilities consequent on the crime."
And it is thus that a pardon
restores a man's cotmpetency as a witness (leaving his conviction to go
to his credibility), or his right to be guardian to his children, &c. And
this removal of disabilities seetns the proper and the utmost proper
effect of a pardon, which, operating from its date, should preclude any
further effect of the offence pardoned. But this is a different thing
fron givitg the pardon a retroactive effect, and making it of itself divest
property vested it the king, and of which by the general rules of law he
could be divested only, as of any other part of his royal patrimony, by
his own grant.
Artd the text-books in treating of pardon divide their subjects into
heads and make the last "tt h e effect of a pardon." And in thus speaking
directly on the effect of a pardon, not one of them refers to or indicates
the restoration of' forfeited property as incident to a pardon and the
legal consequence of it, or attributes to a pardon any further effect than
the removal of disabilities and prosecutions. Of these books the highest
authority for our special purpose is Blackstone, who says as follows:
"Lastly, the effect of such pardon by the king is to make the offender
a new ltan, to acquit him of all corporal penalties and forfeitures
annexed to the offence for which he obtains his pardon, aod not so
much to restore his former, as to give him new credit and capacity,"
(4 C"o. 401). Now, all this refers to the future operation of the pardon,
and especially so, the words connected with forfeitures. which are "to
acquit him of all corporal penalties and forfeitures."
Now, to acquit is
to discharge, and a man cannot be acquitted of a corporal punishment,
a branding or whipping, he has already suffered; and forfeitures stand
in the same sentence.
Artd the omission of the English text-books to refer to the restoration
of forfeitures as att effect of pardon would seem to follow logically from
the fact that in the Etglish government the power to restore forfeitures
and the power to pardon have. no connection with and no relation to
each other.
We have seen that forfeitures were a part of" the ordinary revenue"
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of the crown, of" the proper royal patrimony," of any part of which the
king might dispose, because the title was in him, exactly as any other
man may dispose of any part of his inheritance. But the king's power to
pardon crime was one of his direct prerogative powers (1 Blackst. 269),
vested in him as the executive of the nation, and which he held as a
.xneans of government, and of which he could no more dispose than he
.could of his forts, fleets and.armies, the command of which was another
of his direct prerogative powers. So that the king's power to pardon
and his power to restore firfeitures were of different origin and different
natures, and had no other connection than being vested in the same
person; while in our government they are not, but are carefully separated and vested in different branches of the government. For under
our Constitution forfeitures belong to the United States; they are prosecuted in their name and expressly confiscated to them by the judgment
rendered, and like other public property can be disposed of only by
Congress, in whom the Constitution has placed the power "to dis)ose"
of property belonging to the United States ; while to the Presidenit the
Constitution has given the power to pardon crime, and no other or
greater power than is incident to and inherent in that power in the
common law of England.
And it is to be remembered always that this distinctness of powers
makes the scheme of our government, and is essential to it, for to each
branch of the government its power is carefully meted out.. And when
the Constitution gives to Congress the power to dispose of the public
property, and provides that no money shall be drawn from the public
treasury except by an appropriation made by law, it positively excludes
the President from any control of the national property, real or personal.
And so it has always been held, and the forfeiture in this case was by
the judgment that confiscated it to the United States as absolutely
national property then as this capitol is now.
And as at the time of the adoption -of our Constitution the king's
power to restore forfeitures was merely the legal consequence of his
title in them, and was not derived from and made no part of his direct
prerogative power to pardon crimes, we think that the second section
of the second article of the Constitution, investing in the President the
power to pardon crimes, did not authorize him to restore forfeitures or
to dispose of that part of the national property.
By the Act of July 17th 1863, Congress authorized the President to
grant to those who had participated in the rebellion "pardon and
amnesty," and both of these words are used in the proclamation of
December 25th 1868. Asthe legislature can neither extend nor restrict
the power of the executive to pardon crimes, the only question arising
in the Act of Congress, authorhere is whether the word ",Amnesty,"
ized the President to restore forfeitures.
What may be the technical meaning or effect of the word "amnesty'
in other countries under different forms of government and different
systems of law is foreign to our subject. But the word " anmnesty"
does not belong to the common law and has no technical meaning in it,
and can be used in it only in the meaning of its synonym in our language, and that is oblivion. For the derivative and literal meaning of
amnesty is remnovedfrom memory; and in the English law oblivion is
the synonym of pardon, and is so used in it. For the Act of 12 Ch. 2,
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c. 11, is entitled " An Act of free parelon, indenmnity and oblivion,"
(3 Stat. at Large 166), and these are also its special words of grant,
and tile case under that act, of Tombes, Admr., v. Etherhigton,heretofore cited froni 1 Saund. 362, thcrefbre decides expressly that a granb
of " free pardon, indemnity and oblivion," by an Act of Parliament,
does not effect or include the restoration of forfleitures, and we know of
no decision or authority in English law that decides a grant of amnesty
is or can be anything more than a grant of oblivion.
The word "aniesty" properly belongs to international law, and is
applied to treaties of peace fbllowing a state of war, and signifies there
the burial in oblivion of the particular cause of the strife, so that that
shall not be again a cause for war between the parties; and this signification of "amnesty" is fully and poetically expressed in the Indian
custom of burying the hatchet. And so amnesty is applied to rebellions
which by their magnitude are brought within the rules of international
law, and in which multitudes of men are the subjects of the clemency
of the government. But in these cases, and in all cases, it means only
oblivion and never expresses or implies a grant.
It is observable that the executive proclamations of pardon previous
to that of December 25th 1868, proffered in terms a restoration of
property, while the proclamation of December 25th 1868, relied upon
in this case, used the words "restoration of rigbts, privileges and immunitics," and it might be that these words would be satisfied by a mere
removal of disabilities. But we have not sought to found an argument
on this difference of phraseology.
On the whole case we are of opinion that the proclamation of December 25th 1868, does not entitle the petitioner to a restoration of the
confiscated property claimed in his petition. And the order of the
court is that the petition be dismissed.
Chief Justice DRAKE did not sit on the trial of this case, or take part
in its decision.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
COMMONWEALTH v. THOMAS C. JONES.
* A constitutional provision that any person aiccepting or carrying a challenge to
fight a duel shall be deprived of the right to hold office is not self-executing, except so far as it prevents those who cannot or will not take the requisite oath from
entering upon office. It has no other effect until after trial and conviction in the
course of a regular judicial proceeding.
A citizen willing to take the oath of office, may enter upon and discharge the
duties thereof, without subjecting himself to an indictment for usurpation or office,
until lie has first been indicted, tried and convictcd for the disqualifying offence ;
but if he takes the oath falsely and corruptly, he may be indicted and prosecuted
for the crime thereby committed.
The statutes regulating the proceedings and prescribing the duties of the Con.
testing Board in elections for Clerk pf the Court of Appeals, do not empower said
Board to enter into an original inquiry as to whether the party elected has, by a
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violation of said constitutional provisions, subjected himself to be deprived of the
right to hold office, nor upon their own conclusion as to his guilt, to adjudge him
not entitled to the office and thereupon to declare it vacant.
Such an inquiry being judicial in its nature, and for the infliction of a punishment, the legislature could not, if it had attempted so to do, have conferred such
a power upon a board or tribunal composed of executive officers.

THIS was an indictment under sect. 1 of Article 25, chapter 29 of
the General Statutes of Kentucky, for usurping the office of Clerk of
the Court of Appeals. The facts and preliminary proceedings will be
found in the report of the case of Cochran v. Jones, ante p. 222.
The indictment contained two counts. The first charged that defendant had in June 1869 accepted a challenge to fight a duel, whereby he
became disqualified from holding office, and that being so disqualified
he afterwards entered upon and usurped the office of clerk, &c. The
second count charged that defendant continued to hold and exercise the
said office of clerk, &c., after his election had been declared illegal by
the Contested Election Board ; setting out in detail the proceedings of
the Board as reported in Cochran v. Jones.
Defendant demurred to the indictment and the court below sustained
the demurrer, whereupon the Commonwealth appealed.
Article 8th of the Constitution of Kentucky provides as follows:Sect. 20. "Any person who shall, after the adoption of this Constitution, either directly or indirectly, give, accept, or knowingly carry a
challenge to any person or persons, to fight in single combat with a
citizen of this state, with any deadly weapon, either in or out of this
state, shall be deprived of the right to hold any office of honor or profit
in this Commonweath, and shall be punished otherwise in such manner
as the General Assembly may prescribe by law.
Sect. 21. "The governor shall have power, after five years from the
time of the offence, to pardon all persons who shall have in anywise participated in a duel, either as principals, or seconds, or otherwise, and to
restore him or them to all the rights, privileges and immunities to which
he or they were entitled before such participation. And upon the presentation of such pardon, the oath prescribed in the firstsection of this
article shall be varied to suit the case."
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LINDSAY, J.-In
support of the first count of the indictment it is
argued that the ineligibility or disqualification for office prescribed by
the Constitution arises immediately out of the commission of either of
the forbidden acts, that it attaches at once, and is in nowise dependent
upon a judicial ascertainment of the existence of the disqualifying fact.
If this be the true construction of sect. 20 of art. 8 of the Constitution,
it is self-executing. It defines in apt language -a public offence, and
prescribes a punishment therefor, which punishment is the deprivation
of the offender "of the right to hold any office of honor or profit in this
Commonwealth." It confers upon the General Assembly the power to
inflict other punishment, but does not leave the infliction of the punishment prescribed by the Constitution to depend upon legislative action.
That the deprivation of the right to hold office is a punishment, does
not, in our opinion, admit of serious question.
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"The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed,
may he piishient, the circumstances attending and the causes of the
deprivation determining this fict. Disqualification from the pursuits
of a lawful avocation or from positions of trust, or from the privilege
of appearing in the courts or acting as an executor, administrator or
guardian, ,uay also. and often has been, imposed as punishment. * * * *
"'Tie theory upon which our political institutions rest is, that all men
have certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness; and that in the pursuit of happiness all avocations, all honors, all positions, are alike open to every one, and that in
the protection of these rights all are equal before the law. Any deprivation or suspension of any of these rights fbr past conduct is punishment, and can in no otherwise be defined :" 4 Wall. 320, 322.
Lt' re Dorsey, 7 Porter (Ala.) 293, Justice GOLDTHWAIT says : "I
have ,omitted any argument to show that disqualilication from office or
from the pursuit of a lawful avocation, is a punishment; that it is so is
too evident to require any illustration. Indeed, it may be questioned
whether any ingenuity could devise any penalty which would operate
more forcibly on society."
To the same effect is the case of Barleer v.
The People, 3 Cowen 686. Deprivation of the right to hold office was
a coninoiolaw punishment : 4 Blackstone's Coin. 44. It was one of the
puni.liniints prescribed by the legislature of this state for the offence
of duelling as early as the year 1799 : 1 Stat. L 579.
In f'aming the Constitution, the Convention did not propose to create
a new offence, nor to prescribe a new iodeof punishment. The offence,
and the character of punishment prescribed, had existed in Kentucky
for more than fifty years before they received the recognition mnd approbation o the Convention that framed and the people who ratified and
adupted our present Constitution. That duelling was understood to be a
public offence, and the deprivation of the right to hold office a punishment, is manifest from the provisions of sect. 21, of article eighth. It
is therein termed an offence, and the Governor is authorized, after a
given time to pardon it, and to restore to the party who has offended
all the rights, privileges and immunities to which he was entitled
before p:articipating in the forbidden act. It was argued by counsel
that the pardon thus provided for relieves against the penalties provided by the statute alone, and that the constitutional disqualification or
penalty must be relieved against by an express restoration of the forfeited
rights, privileges and immunities. We do not so construe the section.
The statutory penalties might be relieved against under the general power
of the Governor to grant reprieves and pardons. The pardon he is here
authorized to grant is intended and does of itself restore the forfeited
rights, privileges and immunities. Hence, the concluding sentence or
clause: "And upon the presentation of such pardon, the oath prescribed
in the first section of this article shall be varied to suit the case."
The Commonwealth further insists that if the deprivation of the right
to hold office be a punishment, it is not a criminal but a political punishment, inflicted because of the duellist having, by his voluntary act,
unfitted himself for holding office. For the present we do not deem it
necessary to inquire as to the distinction between criminal and political
punishments. If sect. 20, art. 8, of the Constitution, defines a public
offence, and prescribes as a punishment therefor the deprivation of the
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right to hold office, and was not intended to, and does not, merely prescribe an ineligibility to office, our conclusion on this branch of the case
will necessarily be the same, whether the punishment be criminal or
political.
That the primary purpose of said section was not merely to prescribe
qualifications, to fix disqualifications, and to define ineligibility to office,
has, as we think, already been made reasonably clear; but an examination of the peculiar language in which that section is couched, and a
comparison of that language with that of other sections of the Constitution, will still further strengthen that conclusion.
The qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and of
Senators are prescribed by sects. 4 and 16 of art. 2 of the Constitution,
and sects. 27 and 28 of the same article prescribe who shall not be -eligible" to the General Assembly, even though they may possess all the
affirmative qualifications. Sects. 4 and 15 of art. 3 determine who may
be Governor and Lieutenant Governor of the Commonwealth, and art. 4
and 6 prescribe the qualifications of Judges of the Court of Appeals, of
the Clerk of that court, of the Judges of the Circuit Courts, of the
Louisville Chancery Court, and of the County Courts, and of all the
executive and ministerial officers of the districts and counties of the
state.
When mere temporary disqualification for office, resulting from the
voluntary, lawful, and, in many instances, the commendable act of the
party are defined, we find that the terms "eligible" and "ineligible" are
always used, as in the 3d sect. of art. 3, which provides that"The Governor shall be ineligible for the succeeding four years after
the expiration of the term for which he shall have been elected ;" and as
in section 10, article 8, which declares that "no member of Congress,
nor person holding or exercising any office of trust or profit under the
United States, or either of them, or under a foreign power, shall be eligible as a member of the General Assembly of this Commonwealth, or
hold or exercise any office of trust or profit under the same."
The giving, accepting or knowingly carrying a challenge to fight a
duel with deadly weapons with a citizen of this state was intended to do
more than merely to render the guilty party ineligible to office, in the
sense of the ineligibility contemplated in the provisions quoted and referred to. The Convention and the people intended that such offenders
should be permanently deprived of one of the attributes of citizenship.
Therefore, the words eligible and ineligible are omitted from sect. 20 of
art. 8, and a term used which has a fixed, determinate, and well understood legal and constitutional signification.
Said section provides that the offender shall be "deprived of the right
to hold any office of honor or profit in this Commonwealth," which is in
effect to dispossess him of an "inalienable right" (4 Wall. 321); to take
from him " rights, privileges and immunities" to which lie had theretofore been entitled (sect. 21, art. 8, State Constitution) ; to strip him of
one of the highest and most valued attributes of citizenship, and thus to
inflict upon him that penalty which operates most forcibly upon society.
The word "deprived" is used in this section in the same sense in
which it is used in section 12 of the Bill of Rights, and in the fifth
article of Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
If, therefore, the 20th sect. of the 8th art. of the Constitution is to
VoL. XXIII--48
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be construed as insisted on by the Commonwealth's counsel, it is a selfexecuting penal statute ; it tries without accusation, hears and determines without proof or opportunity fbr defence, and imposes the penalty
without notice to the culprit of his condemnation.
Such a statute is subversive of that clause of Magna Charta which
declares, in relation to a freeman, I"nor will we pass upon him or condlenin him but by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the
land," and of the 12th section of the Bill of Rights, which declares, " nor
can he be deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgincnt of his peers or by the law of the land."
If a rational construction, consistent with the principle of free govern.
iment embodied in these declarations, can be given to said section, it
will be preferred, not only because it will harmonize with our theory of
government, but because it will leave unimpaired one of those venerable
saieguards thrown around individual rights by our English ancestors,
and which has been reasserted by the people of Kentucky in each and
all of the three Constitutions under which they have lived.
It is insisted that the intention that the constitutional provisions relating to duelling shall be self-enforcing is manifested by the oath that
all officers are required to take upon being inducted into office.
It is true that no person can enter upon the discharge of the duties
of an office created by the Constitution or laws of this state, without
first swearing or affirming that since the adoption of the present Constitution he has not sent or accepted a challenge to fight a duel with deadly
weapons with a citizen of this state, nor acted as second in carrying a
challenge, or aided or assisted any person so offending ; and it is equally
true that to the extent that persons are prevented from standing for
office or from being inducted into office after election or appointment,
on account of their inability or unwillingness to take this oath, the 20th
section is enforced without a resort to the ordinary tribunals of justice.
The original, and as yet the principal, object of official oaths, is t6 require from the person about to enter upon the discharge of the duties
of a public trust a guaranty that he will be conscientious in the discharge of such duties, and faithful to the public obligations lie is about
to assume. Such oaths are not usually made the instruments or means
of inflicting punishments or forfeitures incurred on account of the commission of public offences; and in every ease in which they have oper.
ated to punish for past offences, they have been held void upon the
ground that they are ex post facto laws: 4 Wall. 319; Id. 333.
When they operate as a means of punishment as to future offences,
they can be defended only upon the theory that the citizen takes his
right to hold office under the Constitution, coupled with the condition
that he is willing, and that he can conscientiously take the oath or
affirmation therein prescribed. Further than this the oath does not
make the section under consideration self-executing.
The doctrine
announced in the case of Morgau v. Vance, 4 Bush 323, is not more
comprehensive than we here state it. The intimation that there are
disqualifications for office depending upon acts, and not upon conviction,
was extra-judicial. It. illustrated no issue presented by the record, nor
was it necessary or proper in view of the mandate of the court. It was
not necessary to direct that Morgan should be allowed to amend his
answer. The judgment against him was reversed, because his answer
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was already good. Nor was it necessary to suggest to Vance to amend
his petition. Its sufficiency had not been questioned, and there was
no reason why he should aver a fact that he could have proved without
averring. The novel character of the mandate indicates that that. case
did not receive that serious consideration necessary to make it a controlling precedent upon a grave constitutional question.
Counsel for the Commonwealth correctly says that there are but two
modes in which the deprivation of the right to hold office can be made
effectual-one by the act. itself producing the deprivation; the other
by a conviction of the offence in a criminal prosecution. The force of
the suggestion following this statement of the case cannot be questioned.
Counsel says: "If the Convention which framed the Constitution
intended to require conviction of the acts named in sect. 20, it would
have been easy, by the use of the word ' conviction ' or ' convicted' as
they were used in sects. 3 and 4 of the same article of the Constitution,
to have made that meaning clear and unequivocal."
The mere omission of this word in this section raises at most but a
presumption that it was intended that it should receive a construction
different from those sections in which the word was used. To give to
the omission greater weight than this "would be to suppose that the
framers weighed only the force of single words as philologists or critics,
and not whole clauses and objects as statesmen and practical reasoners
Story orr Const. 454.
Upon the other hand, if, instead of the phrase "shall be deprived,"
the word "ineligible," or the phrase "shall not be eligible," had been
used in- sect. 20, some of the difficulties attending the argument to show
that it is self-executing would have been obviated. We have already
shown that the change of language or phraseology in this regard was
deliberate and intentional, and that apt and appropriate words are used
to show that participation in a duel between citizens of this state was
intended to be treated as a public offence, and that the deprivation of
the right to hold office is a penalty or punishment, to be inflicted upon
those who may be guilty of said offence.
Sect. 21 does not prove that sect. 20 is absolutely self-executing.
As we have already shown, it is self-executing when the party admits
his guilt, and cannot, therefore, take the oath of office. In such a case
the practical deprivation commences with the act; and as the Governor
cannot relieve against it for five years, the limitation upon his power to
pardon is made to commence from the time of the offence, instead of
from the time of the conviction.
We have been referred to no instance of a self-executing statute, and
except as to forfeitures growing out of the violation of the revenue laws
of the General Government and of some of the states, we have, with
one or two exceptions, found none, either in State Constitutions or in
legislative enactments, that have not been declared unenforceable. The
Supreme Courts of Missouri and West Virginia upheld such statutes,
but the decision of the first was reversed and the doctrine of the last
overruled by the Supreme Court of the United States. Besides this,
their decisions were rendered at a time and under circumstances which
rob them of the weight to which the opinions of those courts would
otherwise be entitled.
By the Act of 1808 (2 Stat. L.1219), mulattoes and free negroes were
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prohibited from immigrating to this state. It was made the duty of
the County Court of any county into which any of these people should
come, to direct him or them to enter into recognisance, with surety, in
the sum of five hundred dollars, conditioned that he would depart and
remove without the limits of the state within twenty days thereafter,
and never more return , and if he failed to give the recognisanee, the
court was authorized and required to make an order, to be executed by
the sheriff. for the innediate sale of the negro or mulatto so fliling for
and during the tern of one year, &c.
This court, in the case of Dorinm v. The Commonwealth, 1 Dana 331,
held that a proceeding under this act was in the nature of a prosecution by information for an offence against the Commnonwealth ; that the
penalty was a temporary disfranchisement of a free man as a punishment for violating a public and economical law o" the state; and declared
that, inasmuch as it dispensed with a jury, it could not be constitutionally enforced.
In the case before us it is contended that a citizen may "be deprived"
of "rights, privileges and immunities," which are, by the Supreme
Court of the United States, classed anmong the inalienable rights of a
freeman, not only without a trial by jury, but without a trial at all.
A case more similar to that under consideration is that of Gaines v.
Bqford, 1 Dana 481. In 1824 the legislature enacted that, unless the
owners of certain lands, situate in the state, should, before the 1st day
of August 1825, make certain improvements, the title should forfeit, and
immediately vest in the Commonwealth without judgment or office
found. In passing upon this act Judge NIHOILAS said: "To enjoin
what shall be done, or what left undone, and, to secure obedience to the
injunction by prescribing appropriate penalties, belongs exclusively to
legislation. To ascertain a violation of such injunction, and inflict the
penalty, belongs to the judicial function.
" So far as the act in question undertakes to divest Gaines of his
title and vest it in the state, it is a legislative infliction of the penalty;
it is an assumption to that extent of judicial magistracy without affording the accused the benefit of those forms and guards of trial which are
his constitutional right wherever a citizen is sought to be punished,
either in his person or by forfeitures of his property, for alleged violations of the penal enactions of the state. The right to forfbit is merely
an incident to the power to punish guilt. Without guilt the forfeiture
cannot be incurred. The guilt cannot be ascertained by the legislature,
nor otherwise than by a direct criminal procedure of some sort, and a
judicial determination thereon."
Apply this reasoning to the 20th sect. of the 8th art. of the Constitution
as construed by the Commonwealth's counsel, and it will be seen at once
that the construction converts that section into a bill of pains and penalties, and thereby makes it repugnant to that clause of the Federal
Constitution which provides that "No state shall pass any bill of
attainder." Judge NICHOLAS in the same case said: " A British Act
of Parliament might declare that, if certain individuals, or a class of
individuals, failed to do a given act by a named day, they should be
deemed to be and treated as convicted felons or traitors. Such an act
comes precisely within the definition of a bill of attainder, and the
English courts could enforce it without indictment or trial by jury."
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This definition was quoted with apparent approval by the Supreme
Court of the United states, in the case of Cummings. A slight transposition of the language used will show its striking application to the
constitutional penal statute under consideration, as construed by the
representative of the Commonwealth. Here it is insisted that Jones
did a given act, criminal in its nature, and that therefore he should be
deemed to be and treated as a convicted offender, and that the courts
should enforce the prescribed penalty without indictment and without
trial by jury.
We cannot believe that the Convention and the people of the state
intended that the section should be so construed as to make it conflict
with the Constitution of the United States, and to make it repugnant
to that great underlying principle of the criminal and penal law, that
every person shall be held to be and treated as innocent until his guilt
is regularly and legally established.
We have not failed to consider the fict that corrupt men who have
not been, or possibly cannot be, convicted of the disqualifying offence,
may, under our construction of the Constitution, falsely take the oath
of office, and thereby enjoy the honors and emoluments attached to and
growing out of public position. But as no human law can be perfectly
executed, it is better that the provisions of this section of the Constitution shall sometimes be evaded than that absolute obedience shall be
secured through the arbitrary means resorted to by governments in
which individual rights are less highly prized than in this.
We need not determine whether a conviction under an indictment
based upon the provisions of art. 20 of chap. 29th of the Revised
Statutes would conclude the party as to the essential fact of the citizenship of the other party participating in the duel. It is sufficient to say
that the constitutional provision is of itself a perfect statute, and that any
one violating its provisions may be indicted, tried, convicted, and, by
the judgment of the court, " deprived of the right to hold any office of
trust or profit," independent of any legislative action on the subject.
If this power did not exist by virtue of the Constitution, the provision
against duelling might, by want of action upon the part of the legislature, be rendered utterly nugatory as to persons in office at the time
of the commission of the offence, and as to persons not desiring to stand
for office nor to occupy public positions of trust and honor.
The first count does not aver that Jones entered upon the discharge
of the duties of the office of clerk of the Court of Appeals without
taking the constitutional oath of office, nor that previous to the finding
of the indictment the fact that he had accepted a challenge to fight a
duel with deadly weapons with a citizen of Kentucky since the adoption
of the present Constitution, had been judicially ascertained, and he
thereby deprived of the right to hold the office. The Criminal Court
did not, therefore, err in holding that said count was insufficient in law.
In the second count it is averred that the Contesting Board did adjudge and determine that Jones had accepted a challenge to fight a duel
with deadly weapons with a citizen of Kentucky subsequent to the
adoption of the present Constitution; and it is further averred, as a
conclusion of law, that said board was " a court of competent jurisdiction to hear and try said matter," arising as it did upon.the contest inaugurated and prosecuted by John B. Cochran, who was the opposing
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candidate for the office. It becomes necessary, therefore, to inquire
into the duties and powers of the Contesting Board and to determine
as to its jurisdiction. Sect. 24, art. 8, of the Constitution provides, that
1 the General Assembly shall provide by law for the trial of any contested election of auditor, register, treasurer, attorney-general, judges
of circuit courts, and all other officers not herein specified."
Art. 7. chap. 33, of' the General Statutes defines the jurisdiction and
duties of' Contesting Boards. It provides that the Board to try a contest as to the election of a clerk of the Court of Appeals shall be
composed of the governor, attorney-general, auditor, treasurer and secretary of state. Is duties are defined as follows
Sect.. 8.Where it shall appear that the candidates receiving the
higcst number of votes given have received an equal number, the right
to the office shall be determined by lot under the direction of the Board.
Where the person is found not to have been legally qualified to receive
the office at the time of his election, a new election shall be ordered.
Where another than the person returned shall be found to have received
the highest number of legal votes given, such other shall be adjudged
to be the person elected and entitled to the office."
Sect. 9. " Its (the Board's) decision when made shall be final and
conclusive."
Sect. 11. "When a new election is ordered, or the incumbent adjudged not to be entitled, his powers shall immediately cease ; and if the
office is not adjudged to another, it shall be deemed vacant."
It is plain that the action of the Board within, the limits of its jurisdiction is final and conclusive as well upon the courts as upon the other
departments of the government. But it is equally clear, and we do not
understand the proposition to be questioned by the Commonwealth's
counsel, that when the courts are called upon to enforce the judgments
of the Board, or to punish those who disobey its mandates, they have
the power to inquire into and determine as to its jurisdiction in the
particular case in hand. Without jurisdiction to act, the finding and
judgment of any board or tribunal is necessarily void, and may be so
treated by all the world. The cases of Batman v. Meqowan, 10 Mete.
538, and ,ewman v. Kertley, 13 B. Monroe 517, are perfectly consistent
with this view. In Batman's case the question of the jurisdiction of
the County Contesting Board was directly considered, and the mandamus refused upon the sole ground that the notice of contest had not
been given within the time fixed by law, and, therefore, that the Board
bad no jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. And however
anxious the legislature may have been at and before the time of the
decision in Kertley's case to prevent the ordinary tribunals of justice
from being harassed, and possibly overwhelned with the investigations,
and involved in the excitements to which contested election cases may
be expected to give rise, that anxiety has ceased to exercise a controlling
influence over legislation, and appeals from the decisions of County
Boards are now allowed to the Circuit Courts, and from these tribunals
to this court.
In view of the finality of the action of the Contesting Board in cases
of state officers, it is a matter of regret that its jurisdiction and powers
are not more accurately and specifically defin ed by the statute. As the
law exists at present they are to be implied from the duties imposed

COMMUONWEALTH v. JONES.

upon the Board in certain named contingencies. As a new election is
to be ordered, when the person returned is not found to have been
legally qualified to receive the office' at the time of his election, and as
the incumbent may be adjudged not to be entitled to the office, the power
to inquire as to his qualifications must be implied. How ffir the legislature intended this implied power to be carried, and to what extent the
legislature can constitutionally empower the Board to exercise it, are the
two principal questions upon the decision of which the sufficiency of
the second count in the indictment must depend.
We concur in the construction of the Constitution as given by this
court in the case of Hall v. Hostetter, 17 B. Monroe : "That the words
qualifications and qualified are used therein in their most comprehensive
sense, to signify not only the circumstances that are requisite to render
a citizen eligible to office, or that entitle him to vote, but also to denote
an exemption from all legal disqualifications for either purpose;" and
we concur fully in the illustration thus given in that case: "The circumstances under which a citizen is entitled to vote are prescribed in
the Constitution; but he may have those qualifications, and still by
some act have become dsqLualified, and not be a qualified voter, in the
sense in which the word is used in the Constitution." The word qualifications seems to be used in the same sense, and implies not only the
presence of every requisite which the Constitution demands, but also
the absence of every disqualification which it imposes.
The implied powers of the Contesting Board as to the qualifications
or disqualifications of the person elected to office go to the extent here
indicated. It may investigate and determine, finally and conclusively,
whether he possesses each and all of the qualifications which the Congtitution prescribes, and whether or not there are present any or all of
the disqualificitions which it imposes.
The Board had the power to ascertain whether Jones was a citizen of
the United States ; whether he had been a resident of tle state of
Kentucky two years next preceding his election; whether he was
twenty-one years of age, and whether he had the certificate of a judge
of the Court of Appeals, or of a judge of the Circuit Court, that he had
been examined by the clerk of his court under his supervision, and that
he was qualified for the office. It had the further power to ascertain
whether he was holding or exercising any office of trust or profit under
the United States or either of them, or under any foreign power, and
probably whether he had been convicted of any crime or misdemeanor
(participation in a duel with a citizen of Kentucky included), and by
the judgment of conviction, "deprived of the right to hold," or rendered constitutionally incapable of holding, an office under the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth. This last-named power is not altogether clea:, and the court is not so fully agreed as to its existence as
to feel authorized in this case to conclude the question ; but, for the
purposes of this decision, its existence will be assumed, and the branch
of this case now under consideration will be disposed of upon this
assumption.
In any view of the law, the Board could not enter upon an original
investigation as to whether Jones had accepted a challenge to fight a
duel with deadly weapons with a citizen of Kentucky, and upon the
evidence therein heard, adjudge that he is not entitled to hold the office
to which he was elected.
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We have already'determined that the deprivation of the right to hold
office does not necessarily attach, eo histinti, upon the commission of
the prohibited act or act,; that the Constitution does not. and from the
nature,,f things cannot, enforce itself, unless the party charged with the
disqualitying offence concedes his guilt and declines to be inducted into
office by taking the constitutional oath. Where he denies the charge,
and stands ready and willing to purge his conscience, the presunption
of innocence applies in his fvor just as in the case of any other citizen
charged with a violation of' the criminal or penal laws. This presumption c:not be overcome in order to enable the Commonwealth to
deprive a citizen of a valuable right, and thereby to inflict upon him
punishment, except by the finding of a jury in a regular judicial procceiliog had by a court of cmnpetent criminal or penal jurisdiction.
While we are fully persuaded that the deprivation of the right to
holl office is a punishment of the gravest nature, we cannot admit the
conclusion which counsel insists must follow therefrom. The special
provisions of the Constitution providing for the infliction of this punishmeut do not necessarily cut through the general provisions, nor is the
punishmncot prescribed, whether it be criminal or political, an exception
to the Bill of flights. There are no implied exceptions to the Bill of
1i'ights. Everything in that article is declared to be excepted out
of the general powers of government, and is to remain for ever inviolate.
(Sect 30, art. 13, Constitution.) In construing and harmonizing the
different provisions of the 'uonstitution, this solemn declaration is never
to be lost sight of. and more especially in cases involving the personal
rights of the citizen is it entitled to high consideration.
It appears from the indictment that Jones presented to the Court of
Appeals, on the - day of September 1874, his certificate of election,
and that he was, by said court, on that day qualified and sworn as provided by law. It is to be assumed that lie took the oath prescribed
by the Constitution, and became the incumbent of the office, as contemplated in such cases by subsection 11, section 1, of the. article and
chapter relating to trials of contested elections. Having purged his
conscience, and complied with the fundamental condition attached to
his right to hold office in this Commonwealth, lie was prinmafidc an
innocent noan, and by the Constitution and laws presumptively entitled
to the honors and profits of the position.
If; by the action of the majority of the Contesting Board, his right
to continue in the possession and enjoyment of the office ceased and
determined, then it was the judgment of the Board, and not the alleged
acceptance of the challenge, that deprived him of the right to hold the
office and receive its emoluments, and converted his subsequent holding
into an act of usurpation.
We are of opinion that a Contesting Board cannot thus try and
convict a citizen of a penal offence, and by its judgment inflict upon
him a punishnent of any kind, criminal or political.
But it is argued that the courts are bound to assume that the Contesting Board had before it such evidence as authorized its finding, or
rather, that the character of the evidence upon which it acted cannot be
inquired into in order to determine as to its jurisdiction. These propositions are both in the main correct, and if the Board had assumed the
power to act upon an averment in the notice of contest, that Jones had
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been deprived of the right to hold office by the judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction, and had found that such averment was true,
and upon the disqualification imposed by said judgment had declared the
office vacant and the election void, said two propositions would be conclusive of the case. But, upon the contrary, the indictment shows that
Cochran based his contest, among others, upon the ground that Jones
accepted the challenge sent to him by Hale; that the Board tried the
"matter of contest," and thait a majority of its members rendered their
decision in writing, and then and there " declared and adjudged, in
effect and substance, that the said Thomas C. Jones ' did, on the 6th
day of June 1869, accept a challenge from J. Hale, a citizen of Keutucky, to fight him in single combat with deadly weapons,' ' and that
said Thomas C. Jones is ineligible to hold and exercise the office of
clerk of the Court of Appeals,' and that said office is vacant;" and it
further shows that "1said Board so decided and declared said election of
said Jones illegal and void upon said ground of his acceptance of said
challenge, and upon no other ground whatever; and that the other
of said grounds of contest were by said Board decided in favor of said
I
Jones."
The Commonwealth not only fails to aver that the Board found Jones
ineligible to the office on account of a previous conviction, but distinctly negatives any such idea, and shows that the judgment of the
Board was based upon a supposed disqualification for office, which has
no legal or constitutional existence. This is not an erroneous judgment,
which cannot be corrected for the want of the power or jurisdiction in
another tribunal to review it. The Board having no power to act in
the premises, it is not a judgment at all, and is no more binding upon
Jones, or the courts of the state, than if Cochran had based his contest
upon an averment that Jones was under forty years of age, or was not
a licensed attorney, or had committed some other crime or misdemeanor
involving, upon conviction, the forfeiture of the right to hold office.
The power and jurisdiction of the Board to declare an election illegal
and void, and to adjudge an office to be vacant, exists in cases in which
the party elected did not, at the time of his election, possess the requisite qualifications, or where he was not at that time exempt from all
legal disqualifications.
To admit that a Contesting Board may determine finally as to what
constitutes a legal disqualification to office, would be to decide that the
legislature, instead of confining these tribunals to the discharge of exe.
cutive duties, and to the determination primarily of mere questions of
fact, had, in disregard of the distribution of the powers of government,
existing by virtue of the first article of the Constitution, created a high
judicial tribunal, a court with power and authority to determine finally
and conclusively questions of individual rights arising under the Constitution, and provided that it should be composed exclusively of high
executive officers.
It is a matter of great difficulty to draw the exact line of demarcation
between executive and judicial powers, and of still more difficulty to
define with accuracy, how far executive officers, in the discharge of
executive or ministerial duties, may bind the other departments of government by the exercise of quasi judicial functions.
But we regard it as an indisputable proposition, that where the
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inquiry to he made involves questions of law as well as fact, where it
affects a legal right, and where the decision may result in terminating
or destroying that right, tile powers to be exercised, and the duties to
be discharged are essentially judicial, and are such as cannot constitution.dly be delegated to or imposed upon executive officers.
The 24th sect. of the 3d art. of the second Constitution of this state
provided that a Secretary of State should be appointed and commissioned during the term for which the Governor was elected, " if he so
long behave himself well." The Governor, believing that Hardin had
not complied with the condition upon which, as Secretary of State, he
was entitled to continue in office, caused to be entered upon the executive journal that lie (Hardin) - by his failure, wilful neglect, and refusal to reside at -the seat of government, and perform the duties of
Secretary, has abandoned said office, and said office, in the judgment of
the Governor, has become vacant, for the causes aforesaid; it is, therefore, declared by the Governor, and ordered to be entered upon the executive journal, that the office of Secretary has become and is vacant."
16 a contest between Iardin and the Auditor, growing out of this action
of the (overnor, this court said:"'The Secretary being removable for breach of good behavior only,
the ascertainient of the breach must precede the removal. In other
words, the officer must be convicted of misbehavior in office, and we
shall not argue to prove that in a government of laws, a conviction
whereby an individual may be deprived of valuable rights and interests,
and may, moreover, be seriously affected in his good fame and standing
implies a charge and trial and judgment, with opportunity of defence
and prbof. The law, too, prescribes the duties and tenure of the office,
and thus furnishes a rule for the decision of the question involved.
Such a proceeding for the ascertainment of fact and law involving legal
right, and resulting in a decision which may terminate their right, is
essentially judicial, and has been so considered here and elsewhere:"
P(ge v. lardin,8 B. Monroe 672.
The analogy between "Uardin's case and the one under consideration,
if not striking, is at least sufficiently clear to make the law of the one
applicable to the facts of the other.
Hardin's right to hold the office was coupled with the condition prescribed by the Constitution, that he would behave himself well and perform such duties as were imposed upon him by the Constitution and
laws. Jones, like all other citizens, took his riglht to hold office in the
Conmonwealth, coupled with the condition that he would abstain from
participating in duels with citizens of this state. Each of the conditions
is imposed by the Constitution, and in neither case is it in express terms
provided that the. forfeiture of the right to the particular office in the
one, or of the general right to hold any office in the other, should he
enforced by indictment, trial and conviction. Yet, as the ascertainment
or the breach must precede the infliction of the penalty, the court said
in Hardin's case: "Tire shall not argue to proce that in a government of
hucs, a conviction whereby an individual may be deprived of valuable
rights and interests, and may, moreover, be seriously affected in his good
fame and standing, implies a cha:rge, and trial,andjudgment, with the
o])portunity of defence and proof," and that "such a proceeding for the
ascertainment of fact and law, involving legal right, and resulting in a
decision which may terminate the right, is essentially judicial."

COMMONWEALTH v. JONES.

So say we in this case.
The proceedings resulting in the declaration that Jones is disqualified
from holding, or ineligible to, office in this Commonwealth because of
his alleged acceptance of Hale's challenge to fight a duel with deadly
weapons, was " essentially judicial," and was such a proceeding as could
not be constitutionally had by a board, commission, or tribunal composed
of executive officers. (Sects. I and 2, art 1, State Constitution.)
It is never to be assumed., where the language of the act will admit
of any other rational construction, that the legislature overlooked or
purposely disregarded a constitutional limitation upon its power. We
cannot, theretore, imply for the Board the delegated power to exercise
functions ," essentially judicial" from anything in the statute regulating
the proceedin's and prescribing the duties of such tribunals.
The conclus.ins already reached seem to us to obviate the necessity
for noticing the uestion as to whether a party may in any contingency
demand a trial by jury in a contested election case, as also the deductions drawn by counsel from the power of civil courts to try questions
of crime, and to adjudge the civil legal consequences of the crime or of
the facts constituting the crime.
So soon as the Contesting Board decided that Cochran had no claim
to the office, the contest ceased to be a civil proceeding, in which the
rights of individuals were to be settled. It then becane a prosecution
by the Commonwealth and the notice of contest supplied the place and
performed the office of an information. Jones was then put in the attitude of a person charged with a public offence ; and the determination
of the Board upon this ground of the contest is in the nature of a judicial ascertainment of the facts constituting the offence, and the judg.
ment, if enforceable, is in the nature of a judgment inflicting a portion
of the penalty prescribed by the Constitution.
But if there were no constitutional objections to the exercise of the
powers claimed for the Board by the Commonwealth, the consequences
that may follow their exercise would furnish a sufficient reason why such
powers should not be implied from the provisions of the statute.
Jones may yet be indicted and tried upon the identical charge considered and passed upon by the Board.
Sect. 23, art. 1, chap. 29, of the General Statutes, does not purport to
and dues not, as matter at law, limit the time within which a prosecution
under sect. 20, art. 8, of the Constitution may be commenced.
Notwithstanding, therefore, the action of the Contesting Board, Jones
may yet be indicted for the alleged offence and put upon his trial. In
such a case, he could not rely upon the judgment of the Board to support
a plea of autrefois convict. It does not inflict, nor was it intended to inflict, the whole of the punishment prescribed by the Constitution. If
enforced, it will deprive him of the particular office to which he was
elected; but it will leave the question of his absolute ineligibility to
any office in the Commonwealth an open question, one to be hereafter
inquired into whenever the occasion may render the inquiry pertinent.
Further than this, upon such trial had, as it must be had, in a regularly
organized court of criminal and penal jurisdiction, in which the forms
of procedure established to protect private rights, and intended to secure the individual against the irregular exercise of the powers of government, recognised and enforced as part and parcel of the machinery
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of the tr'bunal itself, he may, by the verdict of a jury, be found not
guilty of the offence.
In such a case, if the action of the Board be up-.
held and ent'orced, it will result that he has lost a valuable office, conferred upon him by the voters of the state, on account of a supposed ineligibility or disqualification arising out of an alleged violation of a penal
statute, of which violation a jury subsequently pronounces him not
guilty.
Again, if the action of the Contesting Board should be accepted by
Jones as conclusive of his rights under the election of 1874, but as
leaving the question of his eligibility still an open one, and he should
stand for and be re-elected to the office, and his election again contested
upon the same ground, and upon precisely the same evidence as that
relied on by Cochran, the Contesting Board, which must then be composed in part, and possibly may be composed in whole, of different
persons, may find that as matter of fact he did not accept the challenge
alleged to have been sent to him by Hale. In such a ease the anomaly
would be presented of a citizen adjudged to be disqualified to hold office
by the Contesting Board, and its action afterwards disregarded, annulled,
and overturned by the successors of the officers first acting in the
matter.
And the action of the Board may just as well be reversed. A citizen
may first be adjudged guiltless of the imputed offence, and held eligible
to office, and upon a subsequent election, and a contest upon the same
ground and evidence pronounced guilty, and adjudged ineligible.
An act of the legislature ought not to be so construed as to render
action under it thus uncertain and inconclusive, unless its language renders
such a construction absolutely necessary; certainly no power which may
thus operate should be implied from language that is open to judicial
interpretation. In a case somewhat similar to this, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania refused to construe an Act of Congress depriving a
citizen, or a class of citizens, of the right of suffrage, on account of a
military offence, as the Commonwealth claims the constitutional provisions
and the statute under consideration ought to be construed. It held that
the officers of an election could not inquire into the facts constituting
the forfeiture, saying that, if after such inquiry and trial, they were to
decide that the party had not forfeited his citizenship, the decision
would not amount to an acquittal, it would not protect him against a subsequent siunilar accusation and trial, and would not protect him against
trial and punishment by the proper military tribunal. It further held
that the deprivation of the right of suffrage must be adjudged under
the Act of Congress, after trial by a proper military tribunal, although
the act declared, in terms, that all deserters who failed to return to
service, or report themselves to the proper officer by a named day, should
be deemed to have voluntarily relinquished and forfeited their rights of
citizenship, and should be for ever incapable of exercising any of the
rights of citizens; saying that "this construction is not only required
by the universally admitted rules of statutory interpretation, but it is
in harmony with the personal rights secured by the Constitution, and
which Congress must be presumed to have kept in view. It gives to
the accused a trial before sworn judges, a right to challenge, an opportunity of defence, the privilege of hearing the witnesses against him,
and of calling witnesses in his behalf; it preserves to him the common-
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law presumption of innocence until he has been adjudged guilty according to the forms of law ; it gives finality to a single txial, if tried
by a court-martial and acquitted, his innocence can never again be
called in question, and he can be made to suffer no part of the penalties
prescribed for guilt: -Huber v. Reilly, 58 Penna. 112.
If the necessity for the trial and conviction of a soldier by a military
court in order to deprive him of the right of suffrage is so obvious, it
is difficult to see why the trial and conviction of one not a soldier by a
court of competent jurisdiction, in order to deprive him of the right to
hold office, should be regarded as a matter of"minor importance.
This line of reasoning applies with equal force to the first count in
the indictment. Some stress is laid upon the rule of law which treats
the demurrer as admitting the material facts charged. This admission,
as is well known, is only for the purpose of testing the law arising upon
such facts. If it were overruled, the admission would not bind the accused. He might still plead not guilty, and put. the Commonwealth
upon the proof. But if, upon the trial had, lie should be acquitted of
the principal offence-usurpation of office-he would still be liable to be
indicted and tried in the Daviess Circuit Court for the collateral offence
of accepting Hale's challenge to fight a duel. Upon the contrary, if convicted and punished for the alleged offence of usurpation of office, upon
the idea that he was ineligible on account of accepting Hale's challenge,
after the punishment has been inflicted, he may be tried in the Daviess Circuit Court on said collateral charge and acquitted. In such a state of
case it would result that he would, in a collateral proceeding, be punished
for the consequences of an offence which the proper tribunal determines
he did not commit. These illustrations demonstrate the propriety of
the rule forbidding the trial of a man's guilt in any other than a direct
proceeding against him : Bishop's Crim. Law, vol. 1, sect. 646; Gaines
v. Buford, 1 Dana 511.
That the rule of construction whether applied to the Constitution or
to a statute which will preserve unimpaired the ancient mode of trial
by jury, is the rule which should always govern in interpreting laws involving the forfeiture of a civil or political right, seems to us to be apparent upon the mere statement of the proposition. The importance of
the questions to be decided, and the delicacy of the duty we have been
called on to discharge, have induced us to state at greater length than
we otherwise would have done, the reasons and authorities upon which
our conclusions are based. We regret the necessity which compels us
to differ from those holding the highest positions in a co-ordinate department of the government, and for whose opinions we entortain the highest
respect; but it is a necessity growing out of the division of governmental powers, and the duty of disposing of it is one that must be
courteously and respectfully, but at the same time candidly and unhesitatingly discharged. In the discharge of that duty, we but recognise
and act upon that general rule, " that whenever an act is done which
may become the subject of a proceeding in court, any question of constitutional authority that might have been raised when the act was done,
will be open for consideration in such proceeding, and that as courts
must finally settle the controversy, so also will they finally determine the
constitutional law :" Cooley on Const. Law, sect. 44; 8 B. Monroe 655.
. Legal controversies must be settled by the courts, and they have thus

